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1185 
WHAT WOULD HAVE SEINFELD DONE HAD HE 
LIVED IN A JEWISH STATE? COMPARING THE 
HALAKHIC AND STATUTORY DUTIES TO AID 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the series finale of the hit television comedy, Seinfeld, the show’s four 
main characters, Jerry, Elaine, George, and Kramer, stand idly as they watch 
an assailant attack and rob another pedestrian.
1
 The four are subsequently 
arrested and placed in jail for violating an actual Massachusetts law that 
requires persons who witness certain crimes to report them to law-
enforcement officials.
2
 Although the incident is portrayed in a humorous 
fashion on television, it points to one of the more interesting and 
controversial debates in American law: Should the law impose on a person 
the obligation to come to the aid of a stranger who is in danger?
3
 Or, in the 
terms in which the question has been traditionally analyzed, ought the law 
impose a “general duty to aid”?4 
Although several legal systems, both past and present, have imposed a 
duty to aid,
5
 the long established answer in the Anglo-American legal 
 
 
 1. Seinfeld (NBC television broadcast, May 14, 1998). 
 2. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (2000). 
 3. See, e.g., PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 375 (5th ed. 1984); Melody J. 
Stewart, How Making the Failure To Assist Illegal Fails To Assist: An Observation of Expanding 
Criminal Omission Liability, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 385, 385-89 (1998); John T. Pardun, Comment, Good 
Samaritan Laws: A Global Perspective, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 591, 591 (1998) (“In the 
wake of Princess Diana’s death, the ‘Good Samaritan’ parable of Biblical yore is reiterated in the 
backdrop of the twentieth century as the world focuses again on the duty to assist.”).  
 Stewart observes: 
Whether individuals should be legally obligated to act or render assistance to anyone and everyone 
in peril has been and remains a controversial and an emotional issue. It is a subject that has been 
commented on in this county for at least ninety years. Arguments for and against a general legal 
duty to assist have been the topic of many academic writings from both criminal law and civil law 
perspectives. 
Stewart, supra, at 386 (citations omitted). 
 4. This duty is sometimes also referred to as the “general duty to assist” or “the general duty to 
rescue.” For the most part, all of these terms refer to the same legal concept. Additionally, the term 
“general” is used because, as will be discussed below, courts have recognized exceptions to the general 
rule. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. However, for the sake of convenience, the remainder 
of this Note will omit the term “general.” 
 5. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 392 n.25; Pardun, supra note 3, at 594-603. Specifically, 
Australia, Portugal, France, Russia, Germany, Greece, Switzerland, and Spain, and several other 
European states currently recognize a duty to aid. See id. Moreover, as Part II of this Note will explore 
in great detail, traditional Jewish law, or Halakha, has recognized a duty to aid for more than 3,000 
years. See infra Part II.  
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tradition has been that the law should not impose such a duty.
6
 Under the 
common-law “no-duty” rule, which remains the predominant rule in this 
country, a person has no legal duty to aid another person in peril “even if the 
other is in danger of losing his or her life”7 and “the aid can be rendered 
without danger or inconvenience to the one who could undertake the 
rescue.”8  
Many commentators have noted the “shocking” results that the no-duty 
rule often produces.
9
 For example, in Osterlind v. Hill, the defendant was in 
the business of renting boats to patrons for use on Lake Quannopowitt.
10
 The 
defendant rented a canoe to the plaintiff, even though the defendant knew 
that the plaintiff was heavily intoxicated.
11
 The plaintiff’s canoe overturned 
and, “after hanging to it for approximately one-half hour, and making loud 
calls for assistance, which calls the defendant heard, and utterly ignored,” the 
plaintiff drowned in the lake.
12
 Applying the common-law rule, the court 
held that the defendant was under no duty to either refrain from renting a 
canoe to the plaintiff or to rescue the plaintiff from drowning.
13
  
Although the no-duty rule remains the established rule in this country,
14
 
its scope has eroded considerably during the past century.
15
 This erosion 
began as courts developed a number of judicial exceptions to the general 
rule, the most important of which has been the “special relationship” 
 
 
 6. See PROSSER, supra note 3, at 375 (“[T]he law has persistently refused to impose on a 
stranger the moral obligation of common humanity to go to the aid of another human being who is in 
danger, even if the other is in danger of losing his life.”).  
 7. People v. Oliver, 258 Cal. Rptr. 138, 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
 8. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.3, at 203 (2d ed. 1986). See 
also Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1983).  
 9. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 56, at 375. For other outrageous cases decided under the no-duty 
rule, see Allen v. Hixon, 36 S.E. 810 (Ga. 1900) (Defendant failed to help plaintiff, who was his 
employee, after her hand had become crushed in a machine used at the place of employment.); 
Handiboe v. McCarthy, 151 S.E.2d 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (Defendant failed to rescue child from 
drowning in a swimming pool.); Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901) (Defendant, who was 
a doctor, refused, “[w]ithout any reason whatever,” to render aid to the decedent, even though he knew 
the patient was dangerously ill.); Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1959) (Defendant incited plaintiff, 
who was a business visitor, to jump into the water and let him drown.). See also Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Scruggs & Echols, 49 So. 399 (Ala. 1909); Chastain v. Fugua Indus., 156 S.E.2d 
679 (Ga. Ct. App. 719); O’Keefe v. William J. Barry Co., 42 N.E.2d 267 (Mass. 1942); Buch v. 
Amory Mfg., 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1898); Sidwell v. McVay, 282 P.2d 756 (Okla. 1955); Riley v. Gulf, 
Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 160 S.W. 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913). 
 10. 160 N.E. 301, 302 (Mass. 1928). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. For a statement and discussion of the no-duty rule, see supra notes 6-8 and accompanying 
text. 
 15. For discussion of the erosion of the no-duty rule, see infra notes 16-20 and accompanying 
text. 
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exception.
16
 Additionally, in the last thirty years, eight states have 
circumscribed the no-duty rule even further by passing limited duty-to-aid 
statutes.
17
 An example of a limited duty-to-aid statute is the Massachusetts 
statute referred to above.
18
 Massachusetts requires an individual to render aid 
to a stranger but only to the extent of reporting certain crimes to law-
enforcement officials.
19
 However, four states have gone so far as to turn the 
no-duty rule on its head by statutorily creating a general duty to aid.
20
 These 
four statutes, at least in theory, supplant the no-duty rule by imposing a legal 
obligation on individuals to assist others who are in danger, irrespective of 
their relationship.
21
 The emergence of these statutes, coupled with the earlier 
judicial exceptions, suggests that the duty to aid is gaining increasing 
acceptance in this country.
22
  
This Note explores one legal system that has adopted an extremely 
expansive version of the duty to aid, the system of practical Jewish law, or 
Halakha.
23
 As this Note discusses in great detail, the Halakhic duty to aid 
 
 
 16. These six exceptions, particularly the special relationship exception, are discussed in greater 
detail in Part II.B of this Note. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 17. The following states have enacted or are currently considering limited duty-to-aid statutes: 
 (1) Three states require reporting criminal acts: Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, and Ohio. See COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-115 (West 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-1.6 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE. 
ANN. § 2921.22 (West 2000).  
 (2) The following five states require reporting only of specifically enumerated acts: Florida, 
Massachusetts, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Washington. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.027 (West 2000); 
MASS GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 268, § 40 (West 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. 202.882 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 11-1-5.1 (1999) and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-3.1 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 9.69.100 (West 
1998).  
 (3) The following five states are currently considering duty-to-aid statutes of one kind or another: 
California, New Jersey, Michigan, Mississippi, and Washington. See Marcia M. Ziegler, Comment, 
Nonfeasance and the Duty to Assist: The American Seinfeld Syndrome, 104 DICK. L. REV. 525, 527 
(2000). In addition, Congress is currently considering a bill that would make it a federal crime to fail 
to report incidents of child sexual abuse. See id. at 527-28. 
 18. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.. 
 19. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 20. Minnesota, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin enacted this statutory general duty to aid, 
requiring aid in all cases in which another is in serious danger. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 
(West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1956); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 940.34 (West 1998). For the text of these statutes, see infra notes 132, 135, 131, and 134, 
respectively. 
 21. See infra notes 131, 132, 134, 135. 
 22. See Part III.B Principle #2: Love vs. Autonomy. As noted above, courts have created six 
exceptions to the common-law no-duty rule. Eight states have enacted a limited duty to aid; four states 
have enacted a general duty to aid; and five states and Congress are currently considering a statutory 
duty to aid. See supra notes 16, 17, 20 and accompanying text. Moreover, almost every jurisdiction in 
the country has enacted “Good Samaritan” statutes, which grant various degrees of immunity to 
rescuers who voluntarily render aid to others in danger. See infra note 30. Arguably, these 
developments comprise sufficient evidence to demonstrate that America, as a whole, is moving closer 
to adopting a general duty-to-aid rule.  
 23. In its most general sense, Halakha consists of the 613 Divine commandments contained in 
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requires an individual to provide assistance to another who is in danger, even 
if the aid cannot be rendered without danger or inconvenience to the 
rescuer.
24
  
Halakha has its origins in the so-called Written and Oral Torah
25
 that 
G-d
26
 revealed to Moses more than 3,300 years ago at Mount Sinai.
27
 On one 
hand, Halakha is like any other legal system insofar as it sets forth countless 
rules to govern the myriad of questions and disputes that naturally arise 
wherever human beings interact and form societies.
28
 On the other hand, 
Halakha is unlike other legal systems because its rules are believed to 
embody absolute Divine commandments that provide clear and specific 
instruction on how individuals and societies ought to conduct themselves, as 
well as how they are to find their ultimate purpose and meaning in life.
29
 
Therefore, Halakha is a legal system, but is also much more. 
This Note compares and contrasts the Halakhic duty to aid with the 
American statutory duty to aid.
30
 A comparison of these duties and the values 
 
 
the Torah, together with the many ordinances and decrees issued by the Halakhic authorities over the 
generations. See generally ARNOLD COHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO JEWISH CIVIL LAW 1-90 (1991). 
For a discussion of the term, Torah, see infra note 25. For a more detailed discussion of the history and 
larger significance of Halakha, see infra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. The term Halakha is a 
derivative of the word halak, which means to walk. Therefore, when one follows the rules established 
by Halakha, one walks, so to speak, along the proper path.  
 24. See infra Part II.A. 
 25. Torah is the all-inclusive Hebrew term that refers to the entire body of Jewish writing and 
thought. Torah includes the Five Books of Moses, Prophets, and Writings, which together make up the 
Written Torah, as well as such works as the Mishnah and Talmud, which are written codifications of 
the Oral Torah. For a description of the Mishnah and Talmud, see infra note 43. The term also includes 
more contemporary Halakhic commentaries, codes, and rabbinic decisions. Torah comes from the root 
hora’ah, which means to teach. See generally RABBI MORDECHAI KATZ, UNDERSTANDING JUDAISM 
65-69, 327-66 (2000); RABBI ADIN STEINSALTZ, THE TALMUD: THE STEINSALTZ EDITION, Reference 
Guide 1-88 (1989). 
 26. Halakha requires that one respect the name of G-d, both when spoken and written. Therefore, 
because the author cannot ensure that this Note will be treated respectfully—e.g., it may be thrown in 
the trash—the author has intentionally misspelled the word to ensure that the name of G-d will not be 
desecrated.  
 27. See MISHNAH, Avos 1:1. See generally COHEN, supra note 23, at 10; KATZ, supra note 25, at 
57-61. 
 28. See COHEN, supra note 23, at 8-10; KATZ, supra note 25, at 62-63. 
 29. See generally RABBI SHNEUR ZALMAN OF LIADI, TANYA; STEINSALTZ, supra note 25, at 1-
10.  
 30. That is, the Note does not cover the eight limited duty-to-aid statutes discussed above. See 
infra note 17. The Note also does not discuss in great detail the common-law duty-to-aid rules. 
Additionally, the Note does not cover the Good Samaritan statutes, passed in almost every jurisdiction, 
which grant various degrees of immunity to rescuers who voluntarily render aid to others in danger. 
See generally Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Construction and Application of “Good Samaritan” 
Statutes, 68 A.L.R.4th 294 (1989); Robert A. Mason, Comment, Good Samaritan Laws—Legal 
Disarray: An Update, 38 MERCER L. REV. 1439 (1987). Instead, this Note focuses on the four general 
duty-to-aid statutes. See supra note 20. 
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underlying them sheds light on why America has been so slow to adopt the 
duty to aid, and why, even today, it continues to face opposition. This 
comparison provides insight into whether it is reasonable to expect more 
states to enact duty-to-aid statutes in the future. 
Part II of this Note analyzes the specific elements of the Halakhic and 
statutory duties to aid and highlights the significant differences between 
them. Part III explains how these differences reflect the various values, or 
fundamental principles, which generally underlie the two traditions. In short, 
these differences are: (1) Halakha understands freedom primarily in terms of 
one’s capacity to seek a higher purpose in life, whereas American law 
understands freedom primarily in terms of one’s capacity to live free of 
unwanted intrusions;
31
 (2) Halakha places the value of loving one’s fellow 
man as oneself before the value of individual autonomy, whereas American 
law reverses the importance of these values;
32
 (3) Halakha takes a “good 
man” view of law, whereas American law takes a “bad man” view,33 and 
related to this, Halakha presupposes the existence of a Divine judge, whereas 
American law does not.
34
  
Part IV addresses two of the primary objections leveled against the duty 
to aid and considers how Halakha might respond to these objections.
35
 One 
of the arguments is more theoretical in nature,
36
 the other, practical.
37
 In 
short, the theoretical argument is that a duty to aid infringes upon one’s 
individual autonomy.
38
 The practical argument is simply that a duty to aid is 
 
 
 31. See infra Part III.A Principle #1: Different Notions of Freedom. 
 32. See infra Part III.B Principle #2: Love vs. Autonomy. 
 33. The expression “bad man view of the law” was first coined by Oliver Wendell Holmes. See 
supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra Part III.C Principle #3: “Good Man” vs. “Bad Man” View of Law. 
 35. For a list of the other arguments against the duty to aid, see infra notes 36, 37 and 
accompanying text.  
 36. For a discussion of some of the other theoretical arguments against the duty to aid, see 
Andrew D. Kaplan, Comment, Cash-ing Out: Regulating Omissions, Analysis of the Sherrice Iverson 
Act, 26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 67, 70-71 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplan, Iverson 
Act] (arguing that individuals consensually delegate to government, e.g., police, fire, medical 
personnel, the power and responsibility of conferring benefits to others); Ziegler, supra note 17, at 
528-37 (arguing that omissions cannot give rise to liability because they do not cause harm). 
 37. For a discussion of some of the other practical arguments against the duty to aid, see Alison 
M. Arcuri, Comment, Sherrice Iverson Act: Duty to Report Child Abuse and Neglect, 20 PACE L. REV. 
471, 480-81 (2000) (arguing that the duty to aid would lead to selective and arbitrary prosecution); 
Jessica R. Givelber, Note, Imposing Duties on Witnesses to Child Sexual Abuse: A Futile Response to 
Bystander Indifference, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3169, 3199-3200 (1999) (arguing that rescuers free-ride 
on each other); Kaplan, Iverson Act, supra note 36, at 89-90 (arguing that numerous practical and 
cultural factors contribute to bystander inaction). 
 38. Stewart, supra note 3, at 431-32 (noting that empirical evidence suggests that in a wide 
variety of circumstances and settings, the presence of others inhibits rescue); A.D. Woozley, A Duty to 
Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69 VA. L. REV. 1273, 1293-99 (1983) (exploring the 
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impossible to enforce.
39
  
Part IV argues that Halakha can muster a strong defense against these 
arguments, but that its defense relies upon the three fundamental principles 
enumerated above that are not, or not yet, accepted by American law. 
Therefore, this Note concludes that, although the gap between the Halakhic 
and statutory duty to aid has narrowed considerably, the remaining 
differences between the two duties will persist to the extent that America 
continues to reject the fundamental principles on which the Halakhic duty is 
based.
40
  
II. OVERVIEW OF THE HALAKHIC AND STATUTORY DUTIES TO AID 
This Part is divided into three sections. The first two discuss the origins of 
the Halakhic and statutory duties to aid, respectively. The third section 
compares and contrasts the Halakhic and statutory duties to aid with respect 
to six elements of analysis: (1) the conditions triggering the duty; (2) the 
nature of the aid required by the duty, once triggered; (3) the conditions that 
can limit and absolve this duty; (4) the duty’s immunity provision; (5) the 
duty’s compensation provision; and (6) the consequences of noncompliance 
with the duty. 
A. Origins of the Halakhic Duty to Aid 
The first explicit articulation of the Halakhic duty to aid appeared almost 
2,000 years ago in an early rabbinic work called the Baraisos:
41
 “From where 
do we know that if a man sees his fellow drowning, mauled by beasts, or 
 
 
philosophical arguments against imposing a duty to aid); Arcuri, supra note 37, at 476 (“In a 
democratic society, the basic and most obvious argument against forcing people to help others is that 
such a law will interfere with an individual’s freedom and privacy.”); Sungeeta Jain, Notes and 
Comments, How Many People Does It Take To Save a Drowning Baby?: A Good Samaritan Statute in 
Washington State, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1181, 1198-1200 (1999) (reviewing the argument that the no-
duty rule allows for greater individual liberty). 
 39. Givelber, supra note 37, at 3196 n.214 (arguing that it is difficult if not impossible for 
prosecutors to prove their case because they cannot show that rescuers knew that they were legally 
required to intervene); Pardun, supra note 3, at 605 (arguing that enforcement of these statutes would 
require extensive investigation and adjudication, which would be costly and time-consuming). 
 40. Cf. Rabbi Omar Furmansky, Patterns of Existence, (Sept. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the Geulus Yisrael University Library) (explaining how Halakhic principles can and should 
be applied to social, economic, and legal systems in other countries). 
 41. The Baraisos, compiled approximately in the 200 C.E., provide one of the earliest written 
accounts of Halakha. See RABBI ADIN STEINSALTZ, THE ESSENTIAL TALMUD 41 (1976). Prior to the 
writing of the Baraisos, Halakha had largely been transmitted orally, which according to Jewish law 
and tradition began at Mount Sinai when G-d revealed the Torah to Moses. See supra note 27 and 
accompanying text. 
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attacked by robbers, he is bound to save him? From the verse [in Leviticus 
19:16]: ‘One should not stand over the blood of his fellow.’ ”42  
However, rabbis in later generations, writing in the Talmud,
43
 determined 
that the Halakhic duty to aid could also be derived from a second passage in 
the Torah found in Deuteronomy:
44 
 
You shall not see the ox of your brother or his lamb cast off, and hide 
yourself from them; you shall surely return them to your brother. If 
your brother is not near you and you do not know him, then you shall 
bring it inside your house, and it shall remain with you until your 
brother’s inquiring about it, and you shall return it to him. So shall 
you do for his donkey, and so shall you do for his garment, and so 
shall you do for any lost article of your brother that may become lost 
from him and you find it; you cannot hide yourself.
45
  
In interpreting this passage, the rabbis were bothered by the latter phrase, 
“and you shall return it to him,” because it appears to repeat what has already 
been stated in the first phrase, “you shall surely return them to your 
brother.”46 This apparent redundancy is problematic because a fundamental 
principle of Halakhic reasoning is that no word, let alone a whole set of 
words, can be superfluous.
47
 This principle must be true if one believes that 
the words of Torah are the words of G-d.
48
 A perfect being must use perfect 
speech.
49
 No breath can be wasted.
50
  
 
 
 42. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a. Unless otherwise noted, the translations are the 
author’s own. 
 43. These “rabbis of later generations” refer to the rabbis who lived in the era of the Talmud, 
which was compiled approximately 300 years after the Baraisos, circa 500 C.E. The Talmud discusses 
and analyzes the rules in the Baraisos and the other early writings in the Rabbinic tradition, most 
notably the Mishnah.  
 The Mishnah, compiled approximately during the same period as the Baraisos, or 200 C.E., is 
written in an extremely concise and terse Hebrew style. The rules in the Mishnah generally do not 
cover every possible case, and therefore, rabbis in subsequent generations debated the many problems 
and questions whose solution cannot be found in the plain language of the Mishnah alone. These 
debates, which lasted for approximately the next 300 years, make up the Talmud. In the Eleventh 
Century, the French rabbi, Shlomo Yitzchoki, otherwise referred to by acronym as Rashi, composed 
what is universally acknowledged as the greatest commentary on the Talmud. Tosafos refers to 
commentary composed by Rashi’s disciples. See generally KATZ, supra note 25, at 65-69, 327-366; 
STEINSALTZ, supra note 25, at 1-88. 
 44. Deuteronomy is the fifth book in the Five Books of Moses. The first four, in order, are 
Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers. 
 45. Deuteronomy 22:1-3 (emphasis added). 
 46. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a. 
 47. See RABBI ISHMAEL, SIFRA, Introduction. Rabbi Ishmael sets forth the thirteen fundamental 
rules by which the Torah is expounded. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
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To resolve this difficulty, the rabbis interpreted the latter phrase, “and you 
shall return it to him,” to mean “and you shall return himself to him.”51 In 
Hebrew, there are no neuter pronouns and therefore the word “it” may also 
mean “himself.” On this reading, the first phrase simply teaches that if 
another person’s property is in danger, one must intervene and rescue it.52 
The second phrase then teaches a new point that if another person’s life is in 
danger, then one should return himself to him, that is, rescue the person.
53
 
Therefore, although on the surface the passage refers only to one’s duty in 
returning lost property, a deeper reading, informed by fundamental principles 
of Halakhic construction, demonstrates that this duty extends to aiding 
another’s life as well.54  
The resolution of this passage, however, created another difficulty for the 
rabbis. According to this interpretation, the rabbis now had two sources for 
the Halakhic duty to aid: (1) the verse in Leviticus: “one should not stand 
over the blood of his fellow”;55 and (2) the verse in Deuteronomy: “you shall 
return it [i.e., himself] to him.”56 This presented a problem because two 
verses should not be needed to teach one law. No words or verses can be 
superfluous, as noted above.
57
 
The rabbis resolved this difficulty by determining that both verses are in 
fact necessary because they teach two different things about the duty to aid.
58
 
The verse in Deuteronomy is the source for the duty to aid in general, while 
the verse in Leviticus teaches the exact nature and extent of aid that is 
required by that duty.
59
 If the Torah only provided the verse in Deuteronomy 
and not the verse in Leviticus, then one would mistakenly think, for reasons 
 
 
 50. See id. 
 51. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a. See also RABBI MEIR HALEVI ABULAFIA, YAD 
RAMAH, Sanhendrin 73a. 
 52. Hence, this first phrase, “and you surely return them to your brother,” is the source of the 
Halakhic duty to return lost property. 
 53. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a. For further elaboration on this point, see also 
ABULAFIA, supra note 51; RASHI, COMMENTARY ON THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a; 
TOSAFOS, COMMENTARY ON THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a. 
 54. It is interesting to note, then, that according to Halakha, the duty to aid is an extension of the 
duty to return lost property. 
 55. Leviticus 19:16. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
 56. Deuteronomy 22:2. See supra notes 51 and 53 and accompanying text. 
 57. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 58. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a. 
 59. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a. The verse in Deuteronomy, which provides 
basis for the duty to aid in general, appears in the Torah after the verse in Leviticus that discusses the 
exact nature and extent of the aid. This strange ordering is based on another principle that the events 
and statements recorded in the Torah do not necessarily appear in chronological order. See RASHI, 
Commentary on Exodus 18:13 and 31:18; MECHILTA, Commentary on Exodus 18:13; BABYLONIAN 
TALMUD, Zevachim 116a; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Pesachim 6b. 
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that will be discussed momentarily, that the Halakhic duty to aid is limited to 
the personal ability of the rescuer.
60
 However, this conclusion would be 
incorrect because, as discussed later, the duty also requires the rescuer to 
solicit and even hire the assistance of other people if necessary.
61
 
There are two reasons why, without the verse in Leviticus, one would 
mistakenly think that the duty is limited to the personal ability of the rescuer. 
First, the verse in Deuteronomy only says “you shall return it [i.e., himself] to 
him.”62 Therefore, this verse, by itself, only teaches that one has a personal 
obligation to render aid to another in danger.
63
 It does not teach that a person 
might also have an obligation to solicit and hire others to render the 
necessary aid.
64
 Second, the reader will recall that, in interpreting the passage 
in Deuteronomy, the rabbis determined that the duty to aid is an extension of 
the duty to return lost property.
65
 From other sources, the rabbis knew that 
the duty to return lost property is indeed limited to the personal ability of the 
finder.
66
 Therefore, inasmuch as the duty to aid is an extension of the duty to 
return lost property, one might mistakenly conclude that duty to aid is 
likewise limited to the personal ability of the rescuer.
67
 
As noted above,
68
 the rabbis determined that the verse in Leviticus, “one 
should not stand over the blood of his fellow,” is the source for the exact 
nature and extent of assistance required by the Halakhic duty to aid.
69
 “One 
should not stand over the blood of his fellow” means that if a person is, 
herself, unable to save her fellow, she should not stand and act passively.
70
 
On the contrary, she must stop standing, and instead, seek out and solicit or 
 
 
 60. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a. For a discussion of reasons for this mistaken 
interpretation, see infra note 62-67.  
 61. For discussion of the requirement to hire assistance, see infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
See also infra Part II.C.2 Element #2: Nature of Aid Required by Duty. 
 62. Deuteronomy 22:2 (emphasis added). 
 63. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a.  
 64. In the words of the Talmud: if one would derive the duty to aid only from the verse in 
Deuteronomy, ‘you should return it to him,’ “I would have said that this [duty] applies only when [a 
person] himself [has the opportunity to rescue another’s life]. But [with regard to] bothering to hire a 
rescuer, I would say [one is] not [required to do so]. [Therefore,] the verse [‘one should not stand over 
the blood of his fellow’] teaches us [that he is required even to hire someone to provide the necessary 
aid].” BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a.  
 65. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 66. See Rabbi Aaron Kirschenbaum, The Good Samaritan: Monetary Aspects, 17 J. OF HALACHA 
& CONTEMP. SOC’Y 83, 84 (1989). 
 67. See id. 
 68. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 69. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a. 
 70. RASHI, COMMENTARY ON BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a (emphasis added). “‘One 
should not stand’ means that one should not hinder himself. Rather [one] must go to any extent 
necessary in order to save the life of one’s fellow.” Id. For a discussion of this point in English, see 
Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 85. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
   
 
 
 
 
 
1194 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 79:1185 
 
 
 
 
even hire the assistance of another person who can render the necessary aid.
71
 
For example, if the foursome in the Seinfeld incident had concluded that 
they, themselves, were unable to help the person being robbed, then the 
Halakhic duty to aid would have obligated them to find or hire assistance 
from someone who could provide the necessary aid.
72
 Therefore, the verse in 
Leviticus teaches that the Halakhic duty to aid is an all-encompassing duty 
including not only “one’s person but also one’s purse.”73  
Under this expansive duty, the rabbis also developed special rules for 
situations in which a rescuer would be coming to the aid of someone who 
was being assaulted.
74
 The first explicit articulation of these rules appeared in 
the Mishnah,
75
 an early rabbinic work: “These are who we save at the cost of 
their lives: one who pursues his fellow to kill him, or [one who runs] after a 
male [to sodomize him], or [one who runs] after a betrothed maiden [to 
violate her].”76 
In later generations, rabbis observed that the Mishnah does not explicitly 
state who the rescuer saves as a result of her intervention. The Mishnah 
merely says, “[T]hese are who we save,” but it is unclear who “these” are. 
Some rabbis interpreted the Mishnah to be saying that, in killing the pursuer, 
the rescuer saves the victim.
77
 However, others held that the rescuer is 
actually saving the pursuer,
78
 on the belief that the rescuer prevents the 
pursuer from committing a capital crime
79
 and thereby “saves” the pursuer 
from committing a severe sin that ultimately would be punishable by death in 
any event.
80
 
The latter group of rabbis made two principal arguments in support of 
their interpretation. First, the very next sentence of the Mishnah states: “But 
 
 
 71. See ABULAFIA, supra NOTE 51. For further elaboration on the requirement to seek out 
actively the assistance of another, see the commentary on Sanhendrin 73a in the CHIDUSHEI HARAN. 
For a discussion of this requirement in English, see Anne Cucchiara Besser & Kalman J. Kaplan, The 
Good Samaritan: Jewish and American Legal Perspectives, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 193, 211 (1993); 
Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 84-85. 
 72. See generally Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 84-85. 
 73. See id. at 84. 
 74. The details of these rules are discussed infra Part II.C.2 Element #2: Nature of Aid Required 
by the Duty. 
 75. For a brief explanation of the Mishnah, see supra note 43. 
 76. MISHNAH, Sanhendrin 73a. 
 77. See TOSAFOS, COMMENTARY ON THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a; RABBI MOSES 
MAIMONIDES, COMMENTARY TO THE MISHNAH; ABULAFIA, supra note 51; RABBI MENACHEM 
HIMEIRI, BET HEBECHIRAH, Sanhendrin 73a. See also RABBI YOSEF KARO, SHULCAN ARUCH, 
Hoshen Mishpat § 60.  
 78. See RASHI, COMMENTARY ON THE MISHNAH, Sanhendrin 73a.  
 79. A “capital crime” in Halakha basically refers to murder or a severe sexual crime, such as 
rape. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a (Artscroll ed.) 21-22 n.2-3. 
 80. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. 
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when one pursues a beast, or one [is about] to desecrate the Sabbath, or one 
[is about] to engage in idol worship, we may not save these at the cost of 
their lives.”81 Obviously, the cases in this second sentence do not involve 
victims. Based on the principle that two adjoining sentences should parallel 
one another, these rabbis concluded that, if the second sentence does not 
speak in terms of victims, then neither does the first.
82
  
Second, the passage quoted above is found in the context of a larger 
discussion of cases in which it is sometimes permissible to kill individuals 
who are in the process of committing certain crimes.
83
 In these situations, a 
person is justified in killing the perpetrator on the principle that, by virtue of 
her wicked nature, the perpetrator is destined to receive capital punishment in 
any event.
84
 In fact, the rabbis held that it is better for the perpetrator to die 
prematurely before having time to commit crimes that are even more severe 
in nature.
85
 Therefore, the killing “saves” the perpetrator from committing 
these graver transgressions.
86
 
As noted, other rabbis disagreed and held that the Mishnah does in fact 
refer to saving the victim as opposed to the pursuer.
87
 First, they pointed to a 
subsequent passage in the Talmud that suggests that the Mishnah is referring 
 
 
 81. MISHNAH, Sanhendrin 73a. 
 82. See RASHI, COMMENTARY ON THE MISHNAH, Sanhendrin 73a.  
 83. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin, Chapter 8: Ben Sorer U’Moreh. One example of an 
individual who may be killed before he has committed a capital crime is a “ben sorer u’moreh.” A ben 
sorer u’moreh is a boy who commits certain sins associated with theft and gluttony. Id. If his parents 
admonish him and he ignores their warnings, he is flogged in court. Id. If he still persists in his 
behavior, he is put to death, provided numerous criteria are satisfied. Id. Another individual, discussed 
in Sanhendrin Chapter 8, who may be killed before committing a capital crime is a thief who is caught 
tunneling into someone’s home. The Talmud says that because it is obvious that a homeowner will 
fight to protect her property, it may be assumed that the thief has resolved to overpower and kill the 
owner, if need be. Consequently, the homeowner is permitted to kill the thief in self-defense. See 
RASHI, COMMENTARY TO THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 72a. A verse in Exodus says that 
when the homeowner kills the thief, “there is no blood-guilt.” Exodus 22:2. That is, like the ben sorer 
u’moreh, the thief has already forfeited life and may be justifiably killed. See also infra note 84 and 
accompanying text. 
 84. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 68b, which states: 
But is a ben sorer u’moreh executed for a sin of his [that he has already committed]? [No, rather] 
he is executed on account of the eventual [outcome] of his [current behavior.] And since he is 
executed on account of the eventual [outcome] of his [behavior, we punish him now] even as a 
minor. 
 85. See infra note 86. 
 86. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 72a, which states: 
The Torah foresaw the outcome of a ben sorer u’moreh’s attitude, that he will eventually exhaust 
his father’s property [through continued acts of theft,] and he will [then] seek to maintain his habit, 
but he will not find [it possible to do so.] He will [therefore] go out to the crossroads and rob 
people, [and possibly kill anyone who resists. Because of this condition,] the Torah stated: Let 
him die [while he is still] innocent, and let him not die guilty [of a capital crime.] 
 87. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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to the victim.
88
 Second, they referred to another passage found earlier in the 
Talmud, which states that in cases in which a minor is trying to kill another 
person, a rescuer may kill the minor.
89
 According to Halakha, a minor cannot 
be convicted and punished for committing a crime.
90
 If a minor cannot be 
made liable for a crime, then it is of course not necessary to save him from 
committing one. That the rescuer is nevertheless given permission to kill the 
minor demonstrates, therefore, that the rescuer must instead be saving the 
victim.
91
 
Finally, in accordance with a fundamental principle in Halakha that no 
criminal punishment is assigned to violations of positive duties to act,
92
 the 
rabbis held that a court cannot sanction a would-be rescuer who breaches the 
Halakhic duty to aid.
93
 However, the rabbis nevertheless considered a 
violation of this duty to be a most serious offense, in part, because of their 
belief that “if one destroys [a single life], he is regarded as if he destroyed the 
whole world, and if one preserves [a single life], it is as if he has preserved 
the entire world.”94 
Moreover, the rabbis held that the Halakhic duty to aid, like all positive 
duties, is ultimately enforced through a Divine judge, G-d, even if it is not 
enforced through a human court.
95
 Therefore, although there are no human-
imposed penalties for noncompliance, the Halakhic duty is nevertheless 
enforced and enforceable because of the belief in Divine sanction.
96
 
Describing this idea of a Divine judge, one contemporary legal scholar has 
written: “This notion depends on the fundamental belief that human 
punishment and divine retribution function as equal components of a single 
scheme. [Halakha] makes no textual distinction on which to base 
 
 
 88. See TOSAFOS, COMMENTARY ON THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a (noting that a 
subsequent passage in the Talmud says that, in the case involving the betrothed maiden, the rescuer 
“saves her”). 
 89. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 72b.  
 90. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shabbat 89b; MIZRACHI; RASHI, Commentary on Exodus 21:12. 
 91. See RASHI, COMMENTARY ON THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 72b; ABULAFIA, 
supra note 51. 
 92. See Besser & Kaplan, supra note 71, at 217 n.121-22 (citing RABBI MOSES MAIMONIDES, 
MISHNAH TORAH; COMMENTARY TO THE MISHNAH, Makkos 3:1). 
 93. See Ben Zion Eliash, To Leave or Not To Leave: The Good Samaritan in Jewish Law, 38 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 619, 623 (1994). 
 94. See MISHNAH, Sanhendrin 4:5. 
 95. For a discussion of reward and punishment in Jewish thought, see generally RABBI ARYEH 
KAPLAN, HANDBOOK OF JEWISH THOUGHT 263-85 (1992) [hereinafter KAPLAN, HANDBOOK]. 
 96. See generally RABBI MOSES MAIMONIDES, THIRTEEN PRINCIPLES OF FAITH; RABBI MOSES 
MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH, Laws of Teshuvah 9:1. G-d may punish people, not only in Heaven, 
but also on Earth. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Kiddushin 40a; MIDRASH, Shemos Rabbah 30:1; MIDRASH, 
Vayikra Rabbah 24:1. For examples of applications of this principle, see Rashi’s commentary on 
Exodus 20:1, 21:13, 21:29, 23:7, 28:35, 28:43. 
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enforcement and non-enforcement or between those which are humanly 
enforced and divinely enforced.”97 Or, in the words of the Talmud, a person 
who causes damage to another “is exempt according to the laws of man but 
liable according to the law of Heaven.”98 Indeed, this system of Divine 
retribution led one rabbi to conclude that, when one fulfills the Halakhic duty 
to aid, one is saving not the victim or the pursuer but oneself!
99
 
In conclusion, the author wants to underscore the fact that, at least in the 
rabbis’ estimation, the Halakhic duty to aid, besides being a mere legal 
obligation, is also a Divine commandment.
100
 This fact explains why the 
rabbis based the Halakhic duty to aid on verses in the Torah as opposed to 
human reason and understanding.
101
 Although the rabbis would certainly 
have agreed that human intellect is able to grasp and even defend the 
Halakhic duty without referring to Divine instruction,
102
 they nevertheless 
concluded that its justification must rest on the Torah.
103
 Human intellect can 
understand and rationally accept the Halakhic duty to aid, but in the rabbis’ 
eyes, intellect cannot justify its ultimate truth.
104
  
B. Origins of the Statutory Duty to Aid 
As noted in the Introduction, under the common-law no-duty rule, which 
remains the predominant rule in this country, a person has no legal duty to 
aid another person who is in peril even if the aid can be rendered without 
 
 
 97. Besser & Kaplan, supra note 71, at 197. 
 98. Id. (quoting TOSEFTA, Bava Kama 55b). 
 99. See Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 92.  
The reason [that the bystander] is going to such lengths, even to the extent of incurring monetary 
losses, is not that he is doing so in behalf of his fellow [who is in peril] exclusively, but rather he is 
also doing so in his own behalf, to save himself—to discharge the obligation placed upon him by 
[the Holy One], may He be blessed. Moreover, his [heavenly] reward is a very great one indeed. 
Id. (quoting RESPONSA MAHARSHDAM, Y.D. resp. 204) (alterations in original). 
 100. See, e.g., KARO, supra note 77, § 426 (listing the duty to save one’s fellow as one of the 613 
divine commandments contained in the Torah). See also supra notes 23, 29 and accompanying text. 
 101. See RABBI MENACHEM MENDEL SCHNEERSON, TORAH STUDIES 117-18 (Rabbi Jonathan 
Sacks trans., rev. ed. 1996). Scheerson taught: 
Why is human reason not sufficient in itself? Firstly, because it has no absolute commitment: 
“Today it (one’s evil inclination) says to him, Do this; tomorrow it tells him, Do that; until it bids 
him, Go and serve idols.” . . . Secondly, because even though it might lead a man to obey 
judgments, it would not bring him to closeness with G-d. This is the difference between an act 
which is reasonable and an act which is a Mitzvah (Divine Commandment). “Mitzvah” means 
“connection”: It is the link between man and G-d.  
Id. (quoting BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shabbat 105b.) 
 102. Cf. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Eruvin 100b (“If the Torah had not been given, we would have 
learned modesty from the cat and honesty from the ant . . . .”). 
 103. See COHEN, supra note 24, at 8-10. 
 104. See generally SCHNEERSON, TORAH STUDIES, supra note 101, at 112-18. 
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danger or inconvenience to the would-be rescuer, and the victim may die in 
the absence of assistance.
105
 
The no-duty rule arose in part as a result of the sharp distinction that the 
common law drew between “misfeasance” (active misconduct) and 
“nonfeasance” (passive inaction).106 For liability to be imposed, common-law 
courts required misfeasance rather than mere nonfeasance on the theory that 
active misconduct directly causes harm, whereas passive inaction does no 
more than allow already existing harm to materialize.
107
 Therefore, in the 
duty to aid context, an innocent bystander who fails to render aid does not 
make a victim’s situation any worse, as the danger existed irrespective of the 
bystander’s action or inaction. It would be unfair, so the courts held, to 
impose liability on the would-be rescuer simply for being unfortunate enough 
to stumble across a victim who was already in harm’s way.108 
Additionally, courts were concerned about interfering with personal 
autonomy.
109
 Courts have consistently held that the decision to come to the 
aid of a stranger is a matter of individual choice.
110
 Subjecting persons to 
liability for choosing not to render aid would amount to the imposition of a 
state-morality.
111
 As such, a duty-to-aid rule would be “unduly coercive and 
 
 
 105. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. Note that early common law did recognize a 
modified duty to aid in the “misprision of felony.” See Arcuri, supra note 37, at 474. Under the 
misprision of felony, it was a crime if one did not “raise the hue and cry and report felonies to 
authorities.” Id. at 475 (citation omitted).  
 106. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 373-75; Givelber, supra note 37, at 3173 (“[T]he government may 
put you in jail for hurting someone, but not for declining to help someone.”) (quoting Steve Chapman, 
Should Doing Nothing About a Crime Be a Crime?, LAW VEGAS REV. J., Aug. 31, 1998, at 78.); Peter 
M. Agulnick & Heidi V. Rivkin, Notes and Comments, Criminal Liability for Failure to Rescue: A 
Brief Survey of French and American Law, 8 TOURO INT’L L. REV., 93, 95-96 (1998); Kaplan, Iverson 
Act, supra note 36, at 71-73. 
 107. Ziegler, supra note 17, at 528-37.  
 108. Id.  
 109. Jain presents the historical context of this argument: 
Legal historians trace the origin of the no-duty-to-rescue rule to the Western value of individual 
autonomy. The early common law was largely individualistic; people feared that judicial 
intervention in social and economic affairs would drain them of their self-reliance and infringe 
upon their individual freedom. 
Jain, supra note 38, at 1184-85 (citing Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Tort Scholarship, 78 
CORNELL L. REV. 575, 580 (1993); Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 423, 424 (1985); Robert Justin Lipkin, Comment, Beyond Good Samaritans 
and Moral Monsters: An Individualistic Justification of the General Legal Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA 
L. REV. 252, 276 (1983)).  
 As courts no longer draw a sharp distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance, this concern 
for personal autonomy is probably the most important rationale used by modern courts to justify the 
no-duty rule. See generally Jain, supra note 38, at 1198-1200. 
 110. See Kaplan, Iverson Act, supra note 36, at 68-70. 
 111. See Jain, supra note 38, at 1198-1200. 
The individualist objection to a duty to rescue is that such a duty deprives people of their freedom 
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beyond the legitimate scope of government.”112  
However, in response to some of the outrageous results that the no-duty 
rule often produced,
113
 courts slowly began to develop a number of 
exceptions to the general rule,
 
the most important of which has been the 
special relationship exception.
114
 According to this exception, a person does 
have a duty to aid another where one party is dependent on another, or there 
is a mutual interdependence between them.
115
 Initially, courts were reluctant 
to expand this exception beyond traditional relationships of dependence and 
interdependence, for example, parent-child, spouse-spouse, and employer-
employee.
116
 In more recent times, however, courts have expanded the 
special relationship exception to include many more kinds of relationships, 
so much that “[o]f the various exceptions to the common-law no-duty rule, 
the special status relationship has undergone the widest judicial 
expansion.”117 The exception now includes relationships between carrier and 
passenger,
118
 innkeeper and guests,
119
 land possessor and invitees,
120
 
storeowner and patron,
121
 host and social guest,
122
 prison employees and 
inmates,
123
 and even girlfriend and boyfriend.
124
  
 
 
to choose whether or not to rescue victims. Individualists believe that requiring the performance of 
affirmative acts is unduly coercive and beyond the legitimate scope of government. If people 
choose not to aid victims, society may label them “moral monsters,” but under an individualist 
system, that is solely their concern. 
Id. at 1198 (citations omitted). 
 112. Silver, supra note 109, at 429 (citing Robert L. Hale, Prima Facie Torts, Combination, and 
Non-feasance, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 196, 214 (1946)). This respect for individual autonomy has 
manifested itself recently in the “right to be left alone” and “right of privacy.” See, e.g., Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[T]his case is about the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men, namely, the right to be left 
alone.”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 113. For specific examples of outrageous cases under the no-duty rule, see supra note 9. 
 114. See Jain, supra note 38, at 1185-89. Today, there are six generally recognized judicial 
exceptions to the no-duty rule. The common denominator between them is that there is a significant 
relationship between the victim and the rescuer. The exception can be caused by (1) special 
relationship, (2) contract, (3) creation of risk, (4) voluntary assumption of care, (5) control over 
conduct of others, and (6) ownership of land. See id. 
 115. Stewart, supra note 3, at 395, 397-401. 
 116. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 395, 397.  
 117. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 395. 
 118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(1) (1965).  
 119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(2) (1965).  
 120. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(3) (1965).  
 121. See Southland Corp. v. Griffith, 633 A.2d 84, 91 (Md. 1993). 
 122. See Lindsey v. Miami Dev. Corp., 689 S.W.2d 856, 860 (Tenn. 1985). 
 123. See Brownelli v. McCaughtry, 514 N.W.2d 48, 50 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). 
 124. See People v. Oliver, 258 Cal. Rptr. 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a special 
relationship existed between a woman and a man who had just recently met, thereby imposing upon 
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Despite the growth of the special relationship exception, courts remained 
unwilling to go so far as to impose a general duty to aid, sparking the ire of 
many who thought that the law should recognize such a duty.
125
 This debate 
came into the national spotlight in 1964 when a woman named Catherine 
(“Kitty”) Genovese was stabbed to death in the lobby of her apartment 
building in Queens, New York, while thirty-eight of her neighbors watched 
passively.
126
 The attack lasted for more than thirty minutes. Moreover, at one 
point the murderer even left the scene.
127
 Yet, no one tried to help Genovese 
nor even report the crime to the police.
128
 Under New York law, a common-
law state, the neighbors had committed no legal wrong.
129
  
The Genovese incident produced a national uproar, and the public 
demanded that legislatures respond with duty-to-aid laws.
130
 In 1965, 
Vermont became the first state to pass a duty-to-aid statute.
131
 In 1983, 
Minnesota enacted the country’s second duty-to-aid statute132 after another 
 
 
her a duty to assist him after he took an overdose of drugs in her bathroom). 
 125. See Silver, supra note 109. 
 126. See Martin Ginsberg, 37 Who Saw Murder Didn’t Call the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 
1964, at A1. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id.  
 130. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 388 (“In 1964, media accounts of public reaction to the would-
be rescuers of Catherine Genovese thrust to the fore the issue of whether there should exists a general 
legal duty to exist, and triggered an examination of the common law no-duty-to-act rule.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 131. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2000). The statute provides: 
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the 
same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or without interference with important 
duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or 
care is being provided by others. 
(b) A person who provides reasonable assistance in compliance with subsection (a) of this section 
shall not be liable in civil damages unless his acts constitute gross negligence or unless he will 
receive or expects to receive remuneration. Nothing contained in the subsection shall alter existing 
law with respect to tort liability of a practitioner of the healing arts for acts committed in the 
ordinary course of his practice. 
(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not more than 
$100.00. 
For a discussion of the statute’s historical background, see also Marc A. Franklin, Vermont Requires 
Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1972).  
 132. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 2000). The statute provides, in part: 
Subdivision 1. Duty to assist. A person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another 
person is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the person can do 
so without danger or peril to self or others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person. 
Reasonable assistance may include obtaining or attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement 
officials or medical personnel. A person who violates this subdivision is guilty of a petty 
misdemeanor. 
Subdivision 2. General immunity from liability. (a) A person who, without compensation or the 
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tragic incident involving the brutal rape of a woman in a Massachusetts bar 
in which a room of would-be rescuers passively watched and in some 
instances even cheered the rapists.
133
 Shortly thereafter, Wisconsin
134
 and 
Rhode Island
135
 passed duty-to-aid statutes as well. As of the writing of this 
Note, these are the only four states that have passed general duty-to-aid 
statutes.
136
 
Although these four statutes have been in effect for more than twenty 
years, prosecutors have tried to enforce them in remarkably few instances.
137
 
 
 
expectation of compensation, renders emergency care, advice, or assistance at the scene of 
emergency or during transit to a location where professional medical care can be rendered, is not 
liable for any civil damages as a result of acts or omissions by that person in rendering the 
emergency care, advice, or assistance, unless the person acts in a willful and wanton or reckless 
manner in providing emergency care, advice, or assistance. This subdivision does not apply to a 
person rendering emergency care, advice, or assistance during the course of regular employment, 
and receiving compensation or expecting to receive compensation for rendering care, advice, or 
assistance. 
 133. See The Tavern Rape: Cheers and No Help, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 21, 1983, at 25. In New 
Bedford, Massachusetts, the victim was dragged, kicking and screaming, to a pool table where four 
men swung her on top of the pool table and proceeded to rape her for more than an hour. Id. Even 
though the victim frequently cried out for help, neither the bartender nor any of the other fifteen 
customers in the bar rendered any assistance whatsoever. Id. Some of the customers even cheered the 
rapists on. Id. Eventually, the woman managed to flee from the bar. Id. This tragedy later became the 
story for the movie, The Accused (Paramount Pictures 1988). 
 134. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 2000). 
(1)(a) Whoever violated sub. (2)(a) is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor . . . . 
(2)(a) Any person who knows that a crime is being committed and that a victim is exposed to 
bodily harm shall summon law enforcement officers or other assistance or shall provide assistance 
to the victim . . . .  
(2)(d) A person need not comply with this subsection if any of the following apply: 
1. Compliance would place him or her in danger. 
2. Compliance would interfere with duties the person owes to others. 
3. In circumstances described under par. (a) assistance is being summoned or provided by others 
. . . .  
(3) If a person renders emergency care for a victim, S. 895.48(1) applies. Any person who 
provides other reasonable assistance under this section is immune from civil liability for his or her 
acts or omissions in providing the assistance. This immunity does not apply if the person receives 
or expects to receive compensation for providing the assistance. 
Id. 
 135. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1956). 
Duty to assist. Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is 
exposed to, or has suffered, grave physical harm shall, to the extent that he or she can do so 
without danger or peril to himself or herself or to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed 
person. Any person violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a petty misdemeanor and 
shall be subject to imprisonment for not more than six months or by a fine of not more than five 
hundred dollars ($500), or both. 
Id. 
 136. However, as noted above, several state legislatures, as well Congress, are in the midst of 
considering duty-to-aid statutes. See supra note 17 for a listing of these legislatures. 
 137. Givelber, supra note 37, at 3195. See also Stewart, supra note 3, at 424. Stewart summarizes 
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Courts have interpreted these statutes in even fewer cases.
138
 Accordingly, at 
this point, the true scope of these statutes remains highly ambiguous.
139
  
In State v. LaPlante, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin upheld the first 
and only reported conviction in this country under a duty-to-aid statute.
140
 In 
LaPlante, the defendant hosted a party at her home.
141
 At one point during 
the evening, some of her guests told LaPlante that they planned to physically 
assault another guest at the party.
142
 Later in the evening, they carried out 
their intentions and brutally beat the victim, while LaPlante and others 
passively watched.
143
 The court ruled that the defendant had violated her duty 
under the statute to provide aid or summon assistance.
144
 
In summary, largely due to concerns with interfering with individual 
autonomy,
145
 the common-law no-duty rule remains the predominant rule in 
this country.
146
 However, in response to a number of shocking cases, the 
American legal system has narrowed the scope of this rule, as courts have 
created various judicial exceptions,
147
 and most recently, as four states have 
 
 
research related to enforcement: 
A 1991 survey conducted of prosecutors in jurisdictions with duty-to-report crime laws sheds light 
on some enforcement issues. Three hundred and eighty-seven prosecutors practicing in duty-to-
report jurisdictions were presented with the facts of the New Bedford [, Massachusetts] rape. This 
survey was conducted in an effort to determine whether the lack of litigation via the legislative 
responses to the public rape was due to any prosecutorial reluctance to invoke the laws. Of the 387 
prosecutors surveyed, 157 responded, revealing inter alia that “an inability to identify perpetrators 
. . . as well as the problematic nature of coercing testimony from crucial witnesses . . . account [] 
for the dearth of precedent on point.” None of the prosecutors who responded to the survey could 
recall filing a complaint under the respective statutes. 
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 138. See id. at 3195 (“In each state that imposes a duty to rescue or to report, the statutes have 
produced virtually no case law.”). 
 139. See generally Givelber, supra note 37, at 3196-98. 
 140. 521 N.W.2d 448 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). 
 141. See id. at 449. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. at 452. Even though LaPlante was charged and convicted of violating the statute, 
some have argued that the conviction was not necessarily based on the statute but on tort case law. See 
Givelber, supra note 37, at 3199. 
Instead, the conviction may have rested on the court’s belief that a party host who creates a risk to 
her guests owes those guests a duty. In other words, the nature of the special relationship (as 
recognized by tort law) between the rescuer . . . and the victim (her guest) may have warranted the 
imposition of a duty. 
Id. This argument explains, for example, why the state only prosecuted the host and not all of the 
bystanders who stood idly by and watched the beating. 
 145. For examples of individualistic concerns, see supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text. 
 146. For a discussion of the common law rule, see supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. 
 147. For a discussion of judicial exceptions, see supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text. 
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enacted general duty-to-aid statutes.
148
 But even though these statutes have 
been in effect for more than twenty years, enforcement has been rare.
149
  
C. Comparing and Contrasting the Halakhic and Statutory Duties to Aid 
Having established the origins of the Halakhic and statutory duties to aid, 
the current section compares and contrasts these duties with respect to the six 
elements of analysis enumerated above.
150
 This section will show that, with 
respect to nearly every element, the Halakhic duty to aid is more expansive 
than the statutory duty to aid. 
1. Element #1: Conditions Triggering the Duty 
The Halakhic duty to aid is triggered irrespective of whether the victim’s 
peril is caused by criminal acts or acts of G-d.
151
 Under the statutory duty to 
aid, three of the four states have established this same rule.
152
 Only the 
Wisconsin statute is limited to criminal acts.
153
  
Furthermore, the Halakhic duty to aid is triggered whether the rescuer 
sees or merely knows that another is in danger.
154
 Under the statutory duty to 
aid, the states are evenly split. Vermont and Wisconsin, like the Halakhic 
duty to aid, require the rescuer to assist the victim whether the rescuer sees 
that the victim is in danger or merely knows this to be so.
155
 The statutes in 
Minnesota and Rhode Island, however, only require the rescuer to render aid 
when she actually sees that the victim is in danger.
156
 If a would-be rescuer 
only knows that another is in danger—say, Seinfeld is merely told that the 
 
 
 148. For a discussion of the four duty-to-aid statutes, including statutory language, see supra notes 
131-36 and accompanying text. 
 149. For a discussion of enforcement issues, see supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra Part II.A-B. 
 151. The rabbis reached this conclusion simply by generalizing from the three specific cases 
mentioned in the Baraisa quoted in Part II.A: “From where do we know that if a man sees his fellow 
drowning, mauled by beasts, or attacked by robbers, he is bound to save him?” See supra note 42 and 
accompanying text. It is worth noting that, according to most opinions, this duty only extends to other 
members of the Jewish community. This perhaps surprising rule will be explained later in Part III.B 
Principle #2: Love vs. Autonomy. See infra note 265 and accompanying text. However, under the 
concept known as “Darkei Shalom” (Way of Peace), the Halakhic duty to aid may also extend towards 
non-Jews. See KARO, supra note 77, § 426. 
 152. For the language of the four states’ statutes, see supra notes 131, 132, 134, 135.  
 153. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 930.34(2)(a). For the language of this statute, see supra note 134. 
 154. See KARO, supra note 77, § 426.  
 155. See VT. STAT ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 930.34(2)(a). For the language of the 
Vermont and Wisconsin statutes, see supra notes 131, 134. 
 156. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(1) (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1956). For the 
language of the Minnesota and Rhode Island statutes, see supra notes 132, 135. 
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pedestrian is being mugged but does not actually witness this to be so—then 
no duty to aid arises. 
Lastly, the Halakhic duty to aid includes a duty to rescue another’s 
property.
157
 If a person sees or knows that another’s property is at risk of 
being damaged or stolen, the duty requires intervention to save it.
158
 In 
contrast, none of the duty-to-aid statutes extend to property.
159
 
2. Element #2: Nature of Aid Required by the Duty 
Part II.A discussed how the Halakhic duty to aid is an all-encompassing 
duty including both the rescuer’s person and purse.160 The duty requires a 
rescuer, who is personally unable to provide the necessary aid, to solicit or 
even hire the assistance of another who can render the necessary aid.
161
  
Rabbis in later generations have debated the extent to which the rescuer 
must commit financial resources to secure the necessary aid. One opinion 
holds that there is no monetary limit.
162
 Another opinion holds that the 
rescuer need not commit more than twenty percent of her financial 
resources.
163
 One modern commentator has tried to reconcile these two 
opinions, suggesting that the former opinion governs “where the bystander is 
called upon as an individual to save someone in immediate peril,”164 while 
the latter opinion governs when the bystander has been solicited by an 
original bystander, and is thereby acting as a citizen of the community.
165
 
In contrast, none of the duty-to-aid statutes expressly requires the rescuer 
to commit financial resources to the rescue operation,
166
 nor has any court 
imputed such a requirement into a duty-to-aid statute. Instead, all four 
 
 
 157. For a discussion about the relation between the duty to aid and duty to rescue property, see 
supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 158. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Kama 31b. See Besser & Kaplan, supra note 71, at 198. 
 159. Of course, in every jurisdiction in this country, a person does have a duty to return lost 
property under common law or statute. See PROSSER, supra note 3, § 15, at 89-95. However, no court 
has extended this duty to rescuing the property of another at risk of being stolen, lost, or damaged. 
 160. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 161. For a discussion of hiring assistance, see supra note 71. 
 162. This opinion is based on Rashi’s commentary on the Talmud in Tractate Sanhendrin 73a. To 
review his opinion, see supra note 70. However, even according to this extreme opinion, the rescuer 
need not go into debt in order to save another person. See Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 85 (citing 
RABBI ELIJAH BEN SAMUEL OF LUBLIN, RESPONSA YAD ELIAHU 43 (Amsterdam ed., 1712)). 
 163. See Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 86 (citing RABBI SHALOM MORDECAI SCHWARDON OF 
BREZAN, 5 RESPONSA MAHARSHAM, Response 54 (Satmar ed., 1926)). 
 164. Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 85. 
 165. See id. at 85-86. Reconciliation of the two opinions is important because the first opinion—
i.e., Rashi’s opinion—is from an earlier generation. As such, it is virtually mandatory authority over 
rabbinic bodies and opinions in all subsequent generations. See generally STEINSALTZ, supra note 25. 
 166. For the text of the duty-to-aid statutes, see supra notes 131, 132, 134, 135. 
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statutes require the rescuer to provide “reasonable assistance.”167 No court 
has construed the precise meaning of this term in the context of the statutory 
duty to aid. The Minnesota statute expressly says that reasonable assistance 
“may include obtaining or attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement or 
medical personnel.”168 The Wisconsin statute, arguably the most expansive in 
this respect, expressly says that a person who falls under the statutory duty 
“shall summon law enforcement officials or other assistance or shall provide 
assistance to the victim.”169  
As noted above, the Halakhic duty to aid also covers situations in which a 
rescuer is coming to the aid of someone who is being assaulted.
170
 Rabbis in 
later generations
171
 determined that to fulfill this duty a rescuer could even 
kill the pursuer,
172
 so long as three conditions were met: (1) killing, as 
opposed to just injuring the pursuer, is the only way to prevent the crime 
from occurring;
173
 (2) the pursuer is in the process of committing a capital 
 
 
 167. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(1) (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS. §11-56-1 (1956); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(3) (West 2000). For the text of these 
statutes, see supra notes 131, 132, 134, 135. 
 168. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(1) (West 2000) (emphasis added). For the full text of this 
statute, see supra note 132. 
 169. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(a) (West 2000) (emphasis added). See supra note 134.  
 Because no court has yet had the opportunity to construe the meaning of these provisions, a 
couple of important questions remain unresolved concerning the exact nature and extent of aid 
required by the statutes. First, only Wisconsin expressly obligates the rescuer to solicit the assistance 
of others to provide the necessary aid. Minnesota only recommends that reasonable assistance “may 
include” soliciting the help of others, but does not obligate the rescuer to do so. Therefore, it is 
possible that, in Minnesota, a rescuer who is personally unable to provide the necessary aid may not be 
obligated to solicit the assistance of another. Of course, this rescuer would still be subject to the 
reasonable assistance standard, but this term remains highly ambiguous. For instance, it is unclear 
whether this standard would require Seinfeld to endure the inconvenience of finding a law 
enforcement official or someone capable of helping the person being mugged. Furthermore, it is 
unclear whether Seinfeld would be obligated to hire such a person. In Wisconsin, he would apparently 
have these obligations, but in Minnesota there is no clear conclusion, and in the other two states, there 
is even more uncertainty. 
 Second, Wisconsin and Minnesota expressly provide alternatives to providing personal aid. See 
supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text. Beside this language, one can only look to the reasonable 
assistance standard to determine the nature of aid required by the statutes. Using the previous example, 
it is unclear whether Seinfeld would be acting correctly if he had personally attempted to save the 
person being mugged rather than soliciting the assistance of a nearby law enforcement official. On one 
hand, Seinfeld’s aid could seem unreasonable, therefore violating the statute’s reasonableness 
requirement. On the other hand, punishing Seinfeld, who, with the best intentions, tried to save the 
person being mugged seems unfair and harsh. There is no way to resolve this question beyond 
referring to the reasonable assistance standard, but it is unclear how courts would implement this 
standard in situations like this one.  
 170. For discussion of the duty in cases of assault, see supra notes 74-91 and accompanying text. 
 171. These are the rabbis of the Talmud. See supra note 43. 
 172. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a.  
 173. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 74a; MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH, supra note 96, 
Murder and the Preservation of Life 1:13. However, if merely injuring the pursuer would have been 
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crime;
174
 and (3) the victim will be killed or humiliated as a result of the 
crime.
175
 
The rabbis also determined that in the event the rescuer were later brought 
before a court for killing or injuring the pursuer, the rescuer’s defense would 
not be a type of excuse or justification. Instead, it would be understood that 
the rescuer was fulfilling an affirmative obligation.
176
 In other words, the 
rabbis interpreted the Mishnah as saying not that one is merely permitted to 
kill the pursuer in order to prevent the crime, but rather, one is obligated to 
do so.
177
 
No duty-to-aid statute expressly authorizes a rescuer to kill a pursuer.
178
 
However, in certain situations, the common-law “defense of other” defense 
can shield a rescuer who kills a pursuer against civil and criminal liability.
179
 
Of course, unlike Halakha, this common-law defense only provides a 
justification or excuse for the rescuer’s actions. It does not establish an 
affirmative duty.
180
 
3. Element #3: Conditions Limiting the Duty 
Few conditions limit the Halakhic duty to aid. However, a rescuer is not 
obligated to sacrifice her own life to rescue a victim.
181
 Nonetheless, this 
limitation does not mean that the rescuer is absolved of her duty once she is 
exposed to any degree of danger.
182
 This point can be inferred from the 
 
 
sufficient, then the rescuer is liable for committing a capital crime. See id. For a commentary on this 
section of Maimonides work, see the KESSEF MISHNEH. For a discussion of this point in English, see 
Besser & Kaplan, supra note 71, at 215. 
 174. For the definition of a “capital crime” under Halakha, see supra note 79. 
 175. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 74a. If the victim will not be killed or humiliated, 
then the rescuer is permitted only to injure but not kill the pursuer. See id. In regards to this third 
condition, in situations in which a victim is at risk of being humiliated, but not killed, the rescuer can 
kill the pursuer only before the pursuer has humiliated the victim. If the victim has already been 
humiliated before the rescuer is able render aid, then the rescuer is not permitted to kill the perpetrator 
in order to prevent a second offense. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 73a.  
 176. See MISHNAH, Sanhendrin 73a; TOSAFOS, COMMENTARY ON THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, 
Sanhendrin 73a; MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH, supra note 96, Murder and the Preservation of Life 
1:13. See also CHIDUSHEI HARAN, supra note 71. For a discussion in English of rescue as an 
affirmative obligation, see Eliash, supra note 93, at 625. 
 177. See supra note 176. 
 178. For statutory text, see supra notes 131, 132, 134, 135. 
 179. See generally Prosser, supra note 3, § 20, at 129-31. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See Eliash, supra note 93, at 623. See also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Metzia 62a (“If two 
are traveling in a desert and one has a pitcher of water, and if both drink they will die, but if only one 
drinks, he can reach civilization, Rabbi Akiva came and taught: That your brother may live with you, 
your life takes precedence over his life.”). 
 182. See RABBI OVADIA YOSSEF, RESPONSA YECHAVE DAAS 84 (1975) (discussing whether a 
person has a duty to donate bone marrow or a kidney)); Eliash, supra note 93, at 623 (citing Rabbi I. 
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Baraisa,
183
 which states that a rescuer must come to the aid of another, even 
if the latter is being attacked by beasts or robbers.
184
  
The duty-to-aid statutes, in contrast, contain three significant conditions 
that can limit or absolve the rescuer’s duty altogether. First, all four statutes 
include the so-called “easy rescue” limitation, which provides that a rescuer 
has a duty to aid only to the extent that the aid can be rendered without 
danger or peril to herself or others.
185
  
Only one court has interpreted an easy-rescue limitation. In State v. Joyce, 
the defendant beat and kicked his son in the presence of several passive 
onlookers.
186
 The defendant argued that because the statute required the 
onlookers to intervene if the beating exposed his son to grave danger, the 
lack of intervention was a tacit approval of his conduct, or at least an 
indication that he was not beating his son too badly.
187
 The court held that, by 
virtue of the easy-rescue limitation, the statute did not require the onlookers 
“to intervene in a fight.”188  
The second important limitation on the statutory duty to aid is absolution 
of any duty to render aid if others are performing the duty already.
189
 The 
third limitation is that the statutes do not require a person to render aid if 
doing so would interfere with important duties owed to others.
190
  
 
 
Zilberstein, How Far a Person Has to Risk Himself in Order to Save Others, 41 ASIA 5 (1986) 
(discussing whether a doctor has a duty to risk himself to treat an infectious disease). 
 183. For an explanation of the Baraisos, see supra note 41. 
 184. For a discussion of a rescuer’s obligation to take risk, see supra notes 41-42 and 
accompanying text. 
 185. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(1) (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1956); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(d)(1) (West 2000). For the language 
of these statutes, see supra notes 131, 132, 134, 135. The duty-to-report statute in Ohio is the only 
related statute that does not expressly contain an easy rescue limitation. See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. 
§ 2921.22 (West 2000). 
 186. 433 A.2d 271 (Vt. 1981). 
 187. See id. at 273. 
 188. Id.  
 189. Only the statutes in Vermont and Wisconsin expressly contain this limitation. See VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(d)(3) (West 2000). For the language of 
these statutes, see supra notes 131, 134. Although the Minnesota and Wisconsin statutes do not 
expressly include this limitation, it might be implied in the “reasonable assistance” standard. That is, to 
the extent others are already providing the necessary aid, reasonable assistance does not require the 
potential rescuer to help the others in their rescue efforts.  
 This is an important limitation because many of the difficult cases in this area involve group 
rescue situations. For example, in the Genovese murder, if one of the neighbors had rendered aid, then 
this limitation would have absolved the other thirty-seven neighbors from assisting Genovese.  
 190. For example, at an emergency scene, a parent would have a greater duty to rescue his child 
than a stranger’s duty under the judicially created special relationship exception. See supra notes 114, 
115. Only the Vermont and Wisconsin statutes expressly contain this limitation. See VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 12, § 519(a) (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(2)(d)(2) (West 2000). For the text of these statutes, 
see supra notes 131, 134. 
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4. Element #4: Immunity 
The preceding three sections have examined various respects in which the 
Halakhic duty to aid is more expansive than the statutory duty to aid. The 
next two sections present ways in which the rabbis mitigated the potential 
severity of the Halakhic duty to aid.
191
  
The rabbis provided the rescuer with an extremely generous grant of 
immunity.
192
 According to most opinions, the immunity provision releases 
the rescuer from liability even if the rescue operation is conducted in a 
negligent or reckless manner.
193
 Additionally, the immunity provision 
protects the rescuer from claims brought by third parties.
194
 Therefore, in the 
Seinfeld example, if Kramer had unintentionally injured the person or 
property of a third party during the rescue effort, under the Halakhic duty to 
aid, Kramer would not be liable.
195
 
All four duty-to-aid statutes also include immunity provisions that shield 
 
 
 191. The rabbis were particularly concerned that, if they did not mitigate the severity of the duty, 
then potential rescuers would not fulfill their duty. See infra note 192. This severity would produce 
two negative results. First, potential rescuers would not go to the aid of others in danger, and therefore, 
these victims would die or suffer serious injury. Second, and perhaps more importantly, potential 
rescuers would violate their Biblical commandment to rescue their fellow. See supra note 100 and 
accompanying text. 
 192. In the words of the Talmud, “This is not based on [the strict letter of] the law because if you 
do not say so, the result will be that no one would save his fellow from the hand of his pursuer.” 
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 74a. 
 193. See Eliash, supra note 93, at 625. 
For example, when a girl fainted in her employer’s house, her employer tried to help her using a 
traditional “medical” treatment—a bottle of schnapps. However, by mistake the employer gave 
her gasoline and the girl died. Rabbi Moshe Sofer (who is known as the Chasam Sofer, the highest 
authority of Austro-Hungary in the eighteenth century) released the employer from any liability 
because she had done what she could have done, attempted to save the girl’s life. She had good 
intentions with poor performance. 
Id. at 625-26. 
 194. See MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH, supra note 96, Torts: Wounding and Damaging 8:14. 
For a discussion of this point in English, see Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 87 (“The special 
mitzvah nature of the obligation to save someone in peril impelled the Rabbis to make an enactment 
providing for the exemption of the rescuer from any tort committed in the course of the rescuer 
operation.”). 
 195. See MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH, supra note 96, Torts: Wounding and Damaging 8:12. 
If one chases after the pursuer in order to rescue the pursued, and he breaks objects belonging to 
the pursuer or anyone else, he is exempt. This rule is not [a matter of] strict law, but is an 
enactment (in Hebrew, takkanah) made in order that one should not refrain from rescuing another 
or lose time through being too careful when chasing a pursuer.  
Id. The next section, Part II.C.5 Element #5: Compensation, shows why the rescuer is released from 
liability, not only if she destroys property of third parties, but also if she destroys property owned by 
the victim. As this Note will discuss, the victim must compensate the rescuer for her efforts. Therefore, 
any damages to the victim’s property is merely deducted from the compensation the victim owes to the 
rescuer. See infra note 201 and accompanying text. 
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rescuers against certain forms of liability.
196
 However, in three respects, these 
immunity provisions are not as generous as the Halakhic immunity 
provision. First, the statutory immunity provisions shield rescuers against 
negligence but not recklessness.
197
 Second, the rescuer loses immunity status 
if she receives or even expects to receive compensation for the rescue 
effort.
198
 Third, the statutes do not expressly protect rescuers from claims 
brought by third parties,
199
 nor has a court had an opportunity to impute such 
a broad meaning to any of the statutes. 
5. Element #5: Compensation 
As a second means of mitigating the potential severity of the Halakhic 
duty to aid,
200
 the rabbis granted the rescuer compensation rights against the 
victim.
201
 In general, the rescuer is entitled to compensation for the expenses 
incurred during the rescue operation, including the costs of hiring another to 
rescue the victim.
202
 If the rescue occurs during work hours and therefore the 
rescuer sacrifices her wages, she is at least entitled to receive a minimal 
wage.
203
 If the rescuer deems this amount to be insufficient, the rescuer may 
also sue the victim to recover fully for the loss involved in leaving work.
204
  
Moreover, the rescuer is entitled to compensation from the victim “even if 
 
 
 196. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(2) (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1956); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(b) (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(3) (West 2000). For the language of 
these statutes, see supra notes 131, 132, 134, 135. 
 197. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(2) (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1956); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(b) (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(3) (West 2000). For the language of 
these statutes, see supra notes 131, 132, 134, 135. 
 198. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(2) (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1956); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(b) (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(3) (West 2000). For the language of 
these statutes, see supra notes 131, 132, 134, 135. This point concerning compensation will be 
discussed further in Part II.C.5 Element #5: Compensation. 
 199. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(2) (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1956); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(b) (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(3) (West 2000). For the language of 
these statutes, see supra notes 131, 132, 134, 135. 
 200. For the reasons why the rabbis were concerned about the potential severity of the duty, see 
supra note 191. 
 201. That is, although the Halakhic duty imposes a significant burden on the rescuer, she at least 
knows that she will likely not incur any financial loss for her efforts. See ABULAFIA, supra note 51; 
HIMEIRI, supra note 77. For a discussion of this point in English, see generally Kirschenbaum, supra 
note 66, at 83-92. Kirschenbaum notes that “[t]he rescuer does have the right to sue the rescued party 
in order to recover the money he expended.” Id. at 86. 
 202. See MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH, supra note 96, Torts: Robbery and Lost Objects 13:19. 
For a discussion of this point in English, see Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 91; Besser & Kaplan, 
supra note 71, at 213. 
 203. See 11 TALMUDIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, Hashevat Avedah 82-84. For a discussion of this point in 
English, see Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 90. 
 204. See Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 90.  
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the victim protests, wishes not to be rescued, and later refuses to compensate 
the rescuer.”205 Some rabbis have even held that the court can impose a lien 
on the victim’s property and require that her heirs compensate the rescuer.206  
However, other rabbis have refused to extend the rescuer’s compensation 
rights to such an extent. Some rabbis have held that the rescuer is not entitled 
to compensation if the rescued party is bankrupt.
207
 However, the rescued 
party’s bankruptcy does not alter the rescuer’s obligations.208 Some rabbis 
have also maintained that the rescuer can only recover expenses if the rescue 
effort is successful.
209
 If the attempt fails, the maximum recovery is the 
minimum wage of the labor expended.
210
 Finally, other rabbis have asserted 
that the rescuer cannot recover from anyone besides the rescued party, 
excluding even close relatives.
211
 
All of the various opinions limit the rescuer’s compensation rights in two 
other important respects. First, the rescuer cannot sue the victim to recover 
damages for personal injuries suffered during the rescue operation.
212
 This 
situation exists because, under Halakha, an injured party may only sue the 
actual tortfeasor for personal injuries.
213
 Therefore, a victim who does not 
directly cause the rescuer’s injuries is not legally obligated to pay the 
rescuer’s damages. 
Second, the rescuer is not entitled to any compensation if she did not 
 
 
 205. Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 86 (citing RABBI MEIR BEN BARUCH, RESPONSA MAHARAM 
ROTHENBERG, 4 Prague Collection resp. 39 (M.A. Bloch, ed., 1969)). For example, this rule will 
govern a case where a physician provides aid to an unwilling patient. 
 206. See Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 86-87 n.17. 
 207. See Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 91. But cf. RABBI MOSES MAIMONIDES, COMMENTARY 
TO THE MISHNAH (establishing that once the victim is no longer bankrupt, the victim has a moral 
obligation to compensate the rescuer).  
 208. See RABBI MENACHEM HIMEIRI, BET HEBECHIRAH, Sanhendrin 73a. See generally RABBI 
ASHER BEN YEHIEL (ROSH), Sanhendrin 8:2. In recent years, some rabbis have held that this rule 
governs cases involving physicians and impoverished patients. According to these opinions, the doctor 
is obligated to provide aid irrespective of the patient’s ability to pay. If there are a number of 
physicians in a specific locality, then the community should either establish a system of rotation for the 
free treatment of the impoverished or institute state-supported medicine. See Kirschenbaum, supra 
note 66, at 87 n.21 (citing RABBI ELIEZAR WALDENBERG, Ramat RACHEL § 24, in RESPONSA ZIZ 
ELIEZER (1957); Rabbi Yitzhak Ze’ev Kahana, Sinai 46, in PEKUACH NEFESH BAHALACHAH 129-30 
(1960)). 
 209. See Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 92 n.37 (“This ruling is derived a fortiori from the case 
of an unsuccessful attempt to salvage someone’s property.”) (citing BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava 
Kamma 166a). 
 210. See id.  
 211. See Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 92 (citing RABBI ASHER BEN YEHIEL, Sanhendrin 8:2).  
 212. See Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 91. Therefore, the rescuer can sue the victim to recover 
expenses incurred during the rescue operation but cannot sue to recover damages for personal injuries. 
See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text. 
 213. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol79/iss4/5
   
 
 
 
 
 
2001] THE DUTY TO AID UNDER JEWISH AND AMERICAN LAW 1211 
 
 
 
 
incur any expenses in her rescue effort.
214
 Therefore, although the rabbis 
established incentives for the rescuer through compensation rights, they did 
not go so far as to give the rescuer any mandatory reward or gratuity for her 
rescue efforts.
215
  
The duty-to-aid statutes take a very different approach with respect to the 
rescuer’s compensation rights. Under all four statutes, the rescuer does not 
have any right to sue the victim to receive compensation for the rescue 
effort.
216
 Indeed, as noted above,
217
 rescuers who expect or receive 
compensation for their aid automatically lose immunity status.
218
 
6. Element #6: Consequences of Noncompliance with the Duty 
 As noted in Part II.A, the Halakhic duty to aid is not enforced through 
human courts but rather through a Divine judge, namely, G-d.
219
 Although 
courts do not impose any sanctions for violating the Halakhic duty, it 
nevertheless should be considered a legal duty, not solely a moral duty.
220
 
Describing the truly legal quality of the Halakhic duty to aid, one 
contemporary legal scholar wrote:  
Those of us familiar with John Austin’s theory that only what is 
sanctioned is law, will have doubts as to whether the Jewish duty of 
helping and saving is a legal one. But in Jewish Law there was not and 
there is not such a doubt. Neither the Talmudic scholars nor later 
scholars have had even the slightest doubt that the duty is a legal one 
. . . . [Jewish law] refers to a G-d fearing society with a belief in a 
Heavenly Tribunal. The model is that of a person for whom divine 
sanction is a real, concrete matter. As such, he views these duties as 
“legal” in nature.221  
 
 
 214. See Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 87. This rule is based on a fundamental principle in 
Halakha: “Though one has derived benefit, if the other has thereby sustained no loss, there is no 
liability [on the part of the former] to pay.” BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Kamma 2b.  
 215. See Kirschenbaum, supra note 66, at 90 (citing TOSAFOS, COMMENTARY ON THE 
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Bava Metzia 31b). 
 216. For the language of the four states’ statutes, see supra notes 131, 132, 134, 135. 
 217. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 218. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(2) (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1956); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(b) (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34(3) (West 2000). For the language of 
these statutes, see supra notes 131, 132, 134, 135.  
 219. For a discussion of human and Divine judgment, see supra notes 96-98 and accompanying 
text. 
 220. For an illustration of legal and moral duty, see infra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 221. Eliash, supra note 93, at 623-24. The following true story, which occurred approximately 400 
years ago, illustrates the true legal nature of the Halakhic duty to aid: 
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In contrast, all four duty-to-aid statutes impose penalties for 
noncompliance. Rhode Island has the most stringent penalty. Under its 
statute, a violator can be jailed up to six months, or fined as much as $500, or 
both.
222
 In Wisconsin, a violator can be found guilty of a Class C 
misdemeanor and jailed up to thirty days, or fined as much as $500, or 
both.
223
 In Minnesota, a violator can be found guilty of a petty misdemeanor, 
and a court can impose a civil penalty of not more than $300.
224
 Vermont sets 
a $100 maximum penalty.
225
  
In sum, the Halakhic duty to aid is more expansive than the statutory duty 
to aid with respect to nearly every element of analysis. However, to lessen 
the potential severity of the Halakhic duty, the rabbis provided the rescuer 
with extremely generous immunity protections and compensation rights.
226
 
Also, the Halakhic duty to aid is enforced not through human courts but 
through a Divine judge.
227
  
III. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE HALAKHIC AND 
STATUTORY DUTIES TO AID 
Part II analyzed the many different respects in which the two duties differ 
and showed that the Halakhic duty is far more expansive than its American 
counterpart. Part III explores three of the fundamental principles underlying 
 
 
All the Jews in the city-state of Ankona in Italy were deported. The Duke of Pizaro, another city-
state in Italy, was ready to accept the deported Jews. They promised him that all the Jewish 
international traders from all the Mediterranean ports would ship their goods to the Port of Pizaro 
instead of the Port of Ankona. The Jews boycotted the Port of Ankona, but after a while they 
found that the Port of Pizaro was not as good as the Port of Ankona, and they were losing money. 
Merchants do not like to lose money and they started to go back to the boycotted Ankona. The 
Jews of Pizaro found themselves under a risk of deportation from Pizaro. They applied to the 
highest Rabbinical authority of Turkey and the Balkans, Rabbi Moshe Mittrani (who is known as 
the Mabit). Rabbi Mittrani, based on the Jewish “good Samaritan” doctrine, ordered the 
international traders to send the ships only to the Port of Pizaro while he decided who would 
compensate them for the damages they suffered because of it (in principle the Jews of Pizaro had 
to bear these losses, but until they could collect the money, every Jew in the world had to 
participate because every one was obligated). If you read Rabbi Mittrani’s decision you do not 
find a request or recommendation; you find a standard judicial decision which imposes a legal 
duty with no doubt that it will be fulfilled. 
Id. at 624 (citing RABBI MOSES MITTRANI (MABIT), RESPONSA 237). 
 222. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1956).  
 223. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 2000); id. § 939.51(3)(c). 
 224. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 2000); id. § 609.02 (4a). 
 225. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(c) (2000). 
 226. See generally supra Part II.C.4 Element #4: Immunity; Part II.C.5 Element #5: 
Compensation. 
 227. For a discussion and illustration of the Halakhic duty as legal and moral, see supra notes 96-
98 and accompanying text. 
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Halakha and American law generally and explains how these principles 
account for the many differences observed in Part II. These three principles 
are: (1) Halakha understands freedom primarily in terms of one’s capacity to 
seek a higher purpose in life, whereas American law understands freedom 
primarily in terms of one’s capacity to live free from unwanted intrusions; (2) 
Halakha places the value of loving one’s fellow as oneself before the value 
of individual autonomy, whereas American law reverses the importance of 
these values; (3) Halakha takes a “good man” view of law, whereas 
American law takes a “bad man” view; and, related to this, Halakha 
presupposes the existence of a Divine judge, whereas American law does 
not.  
A. Principle #1: Different Notions of Freedom 
Halakha understands freedom primarily in terms of one’s capacity to seek 
a higher purpose in life.
228
 Therefore, true freedom is liberation from 
whatever constraints and forces that prevent a person from realizing her 
higher purpose.
229
 Because Halakha establishes that this purpose can only be 
found in the Divine commandments,
230
 a person is free in the truest sense 
only when she fulfills these commandments.
231
  
 
 
 228. See generally RABBI SHNEUR ZALMAN OF LIADI, TANYA ch. 31; RABBI YAAKOV TAUBER, 
BEYOND THE LETTER OF THE LAW 318-19 (1995); Rabbi Yaakov Tauber, Is Judaism a Theocracy?, at 
http://www.chabadonline.com/scripts/tgij/paperp/Article.asp?/ArticleID=2184 (last visited Jan. 20, 
2001). This idea is illustrated well in the fact that Moses demanded that Pharoah emancipate the 
Jewish people from slavery, not for their own sake, but so that they could receive the Torah and 
Divine commandments at Mount Sinai and thereby be able to serve G-d. See Exodus 7:26 (“Send out 
my People so that they may serve Me.”) (emphasis added). Therefore, according to the Torah, true 
freedom does involve a form of servitude. Only, rather than serving temporal and finite forces, one 
serves G-d. See, e.g., Leviticus 25:55 (“For the Children of Israel are slaves unto Me, they are My 
slaves, whom I have taken out of the land of Egypt.”). 
 229. See RABBI MENACHEM MENDEL SCHNEERSON, 7 IGROT KODESH (1953). Schneerson 
teaches: 
Every day a person must “go out of Egypt,” that is, he must escape from limits, temptations and 
obstructions that his physical existence places in the way of his spiritual life . . . . Only then can he 
enjoy real freedom, the sense of serenity and harmony which is the prelude to freedom and peace 
in the world at large. 
Id. 
 230. See generally RABBI SHNEUR ZALMAN OF LIADI, TANYA. For a discussion of Halakha as the 
product the will of G-d, see also supra note 29 and accompanying text.  
 231. See MISHNAH, Avos 6:2. 
The Tablets were the work of G-d, and the writing was the writing of G-d, charut (engraved) on 
the Tablets. Do not read charut but cherut (freedom), for there is no free man except one who 
occupies himself with the study of the Torah; and anyone who occupies himself with the study of 
Torah becomes elevated. 
Id. For a discussion of this point in English, see Besser & Kaplan, supra note 71, at 194-95 (citing 
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Kiddushin 31a; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Avodah Zorah 3a; BABYLONIAN 
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In contrast to Halakha, American law has primarily defined freedom in 
terms of one’s capacity to live free of unwanted intrusions.232 American 
courts, especially in this past century, have frequently struck down legislation 
that imposes morality on individuals and that deprives them of their personal 
autonomy.
233
 Indeed, modern courts have continued to uphold the common-
law no-duty rule out of a respect for this notion of individual autonomy.
234
 
These conflicting notions of freedom are clearly reflected in the Halakhic 
and statutory duties to aid and help explain why they differ so greatly. For 
example, with respect to Element #1: Conditions Triggering the Duty and 
Element #2: Nature of Aid Required by the Duty, it is now easier to 
understand why the rabbis were able to impose such a heavy burden on the 
rescuer.
235
 Unlike American judges and legislators, the rabbis did not need to 
contend with the issue of individual autonomy.
236
 To the contrary, the rabbis 
believed that, by imposing such an expansive duty, they were counteracting 
selfish instincts within a potential rescuer that would prevent fulfillment of 
the Divine commandment of saving another.
237
  
Conversely, legislators in America have thus far only been able to 
establish a reasonable assistance standard.
238
 The following statement might 
express the underlying rationale for this standard:  
To the extent the rescue effort only requires reasonable assistance, 
then the benefits
239
 of aiding the victim outweigh the costs of 
infringing on the rescuer’s individual autonomy. However, when the 
 
 
TALMUD, Bava Kamma 38a, 87a.). 
 232. See Agulnick & Rivkin, supra note 106, at 96 (“Deeply ingrained in the American psyche is 
the individual’s desire to live free from government interference. Accordingly, American law has long 
respected the autonomy of the individual and has been reluctant to punish for failure to rescue.”). See 
also supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text. 
 233. For a discussion of individualism, see supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra note 109. 
 235. See supra Part II.C.1 Element #1: Conditions Triggering the Duty; Part II.C.2 Element #2: 
Nature of Aid Required by the Duty. 
 236. Halakha is also concerned with individual autonomy but defines it very differently than the 
American legal system. According to Halakha, the truest desire of a person is to fulfill G-d’s will as it 
is manifest in the Divine commandments. Therefore, when one observes the commandments, she is 
actually acting in conformity, not merely with G-d’s will, but also with her own will. When one 
opposes G-d’s will, she is being directed, not by her own will, but by an external, materialistic 
dimension of her soul. As such, the person who follows G-d’s will and observes His commandments 
acts in an autonomous fashion, while one who does not, and instead follows the dictates of her external 
self, acts in a heteronymous fashion. See generally RABBI SHNEUR ZALMAN OF LIADI, TANYA.  
 237. See generally RABBI SHNEUR ZALMAN OF LIADA, TANYA.. 
 238. For a discussion of the reasonable assistance standard, see supra note 167 and accompanying 
text. 
 239. Cf. Jain, supra note 38, at 1198-1200 (arguing that an individualist-oriented person 
recognizes two potential benefits in the duty to aid: (1) the benefit of saving the actual victim; and (2) 
the benefit of knowing that others will be required by law to provide the same aid on her behalf).  
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rescue effort requires more than reasonable assistance, the balance 
shifts in favor of the rescuer’s autonomy interest, and therefore, it is no 
longer proper to impose a duty to aid. 
This rationale can also help explain why the statutes generally do not require 
the rescuer to hire or solicit the help of others and, with respect to Element 
#3: Conditions Limiting the Duty, why the rescuer is not required to expose 
herself to danger.
240
 These requirements would force the rescuer to exert an 
extraordinary effort, and at that point, the interest in autonomy prevails. 
The different notions of freedom are particularly evident in Element #5: 
Compensation. Recall that according to the Halakhic duty to aid, the rescuer 
is entitled to compensation for the costs of the rescue operation, even if the 
victim does not wish to be saved and refuses to pay the rescuer.
241
 On one 
hand, this rule clearly demonstrates the minimal significance that Halakha 
accords to an individual’s desire to live free of unwanted intrusions. On the 
other hand, all of the duty-to-aid statutes preserve the common-law no-duty 
rule that the rescuer is not entitled to compensation for rescue efforts under 
any condition.
242
 
B. Principle #2: Love vs. Autonomy 
One of the most fundamental principles in the Torah is the injunction to 
love one’s fellow as oneself.243 This injunction is not only a fundamental 
principle but is also one of the Divine commandments.
244
 This 
commandment is clearly connected to the Halakhic duty to aid. If one must 
love her fellow as herself (the Love Principle), then it is altogether sensible 
that one must save her fellow from danger. Indeed, because of the close 
 
 
 240. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra Part II.C.5 Element #5: Compensation. 
 243. “You shall love your fellow as yourself.” See generally KEHOT PUBLICATION SOCIETY, 
KUNTRES AHAVAT YISRAEL 5-12, 25-68 (Rabbi Zalman Posner et al. trans., rev. ed. 1998); RABBI 
SHNEUR ZALMAN OF LIADI, TANYA, ch. 32. See also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shabbat 31a (“What is 
hateful to you, do not inflict upon your fellow man; this is the entire Torah, the rest is commentary.”); 
MIDRASH, Vayikra Rabbah 24 (“Rabbi Akiva said: ‘this [commandment to love one’s fellow as 
oneself] is a great rule in the Torah.’”); JERUSALEM TALMUD, Nedarim 9:4; RABBI YOSEF YITZCHOK 
SCHNEERSOHN, LIKKUTEI DIBBURIM 412 (“The Baal Shem Tov declared that [love of one’s fellow] is 
the first portal that leads into the courtyards of G-d.”). Additionally, some prayer liturgies begin with 
the statement, “I hereby take upon myself the commandment, ‘You shall love your fellow as 
yourself.’” RABBI SHNEUR ZALMAN OF LIADI, SIDDUR TEHILLAT HASHEM 12 (Rabbi Nissen Mangel 
trans., 2d compact ed. 1988). 
 244. Leviticus 19:18. See also RABBI MOSES MAIMONIDES, SEFER HAMITZVOT, Positive Mitzvah 
206 (enumerating the injunction to love one’s fellow as oneself as one of the 613 Divine 
commandments). 
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connection between these two commandments, there should be no surprise 
that the verses from which they are derived are virtually adjacent to one 
another.
245
 
The Love Principle is especially manifest in the first three elements of 
analysis. Recall the many conditions that can trigger the Halakhic duty to aid 
and the extent of aid required, once the duty is triggered.
246
 Indeed, as 
discussed in the third element of analysis, the rescuer is still required to aid 
the victim even if the rescue effort puts the rescuer in danger.
247
 This 
seemingly irrational requirement makes sense, however, in light of the Love 
Principle. Just as one would surely, out of self-love, expose herself to danger 
in order to save her life, then, under the Love Principle, she must do the same 
for her fellow. The only difference is that when she saves her fellow, rather 
than acting from a natural self-love, she acts out of a supernatural love for 
another, which has been commanded by G-d.
248
 
Obviously, the American legal system has never recognized the Love 
Principle, or at least, it has not done so explicitly.
249
 As noted above, 
America and the legal tradition out of which it arose have always placed a 
tremendous value on individual autonomy (the Autonomy Principle).
250
 
Therefore, in America if one wishes to love her fellow as herself, she may of 
course do so, but it is inappropriate for law to require this love.
251
  
However, by digging deeper, one can see that many laws exist in America 
today that do indeed infringe upon the Autonomy Principle.
252
 The existence 
of the modern welfare-state illustrates this point well.
253
 The dozens of state 
and federal programs that comprise the welfare system, as well as the billions 
of dollars in taxes used to fund these programs,
254
 show that the American 
legal system, at least in part, recognizes some form of the Love Principle.
255
 
 
 
 245. The verse, “One should not stand,” is found at Leviticus 19:16. The verse instructing a person 
to love one’s fellow as oneself comes only two verses later at Leviticus 19:18. 
 246. See supra Part II.C.1 Element #1: Conditions Triggering the Duty; Part II.C.2 Element #2: 
Nature of Aid Required by the Duty; Part II.C.3 Element #3: Conditions Limiting the Duty. 
 247. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 248. See supra note 244. 
 249. See infra text accompanying notes 250 and 251. 
 250. For a discussion of autonomy in the American legal tradition, see supra notes 109-12 and 
accompanying text. 
 251. See supra notes 109-112 and accompanying text. 
 252. For a discussion of duties infringing on American autonomy, see infra note 255 and 
accompanying text. 
 253. See THOMAS R. DYE, POLITICS IN AMERICA 624-27 (4th ed. 2001); U.S BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 121, 124, 389, 392, 393 (1999). 
 254. See U.S BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 121, 124, 
389, 392, 393 (1999). 
 255. See Jennifer Bagby, Note, Justifications for State Bystander Intervention Statutes: Why 
Crime Witnesses Should Be Required to Call for Help, 33 IND. L. REV. 571, 579-80 (2000) (arguing 
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This proposition—that America is partially open to the Love Principle—
can be used to explain the evolution of the duty-to-aid rules. Indeed, this 
author suggests that one can best understand the evolution of these rules as 
the result of an ongoing tension between the Autonomy Principle (justifying 
the no-duty rule) and the Love Principle (justifying the duty to aid).
256
 
Courts first circumscribed the no-duty rule by establishing certain 
exceptions, the most important of which has been the special-relationship 
exception.
257
 Recall that courts initially limited this exception to traditional 
relationships in which one party was dependent upon the other, or where 
there was a mutual interdependence between them, for example, parent-child 
or spouse-spouse relationships.
258
 By imposing liability on such parties, the 
special-relationship exception effectively requires these parties to act in 
conformity with a love that they should, whether by tradition or nature, feel 
for one another in any event. That is, because a parent should love her child, 
the special-relationship exception imposes a legal obligation upon the parent 
to do so, even if she would rather not.
259
 
Moreover, that courts have expanded the scope of the special-relationship 
exception beyond traditional relationships (i.e., carrier-passenger, host-social 
guest, prison employees-inmates, girlfriend-boyfriend relationships) suggests 
that they are becoming increasingly favorable to the Love Principle.
260
 
Whereas initially courts limited the exception to relationships consisting of 
traditional or natural love, they are now requiring individuals to manifest a 
nontraditional love of sorts. For example, when a court rules that a prison 
employee has a legal obligation to come to the aid of an inmate,
261
 the court 
is effectively requiring the employee to act out of a supernatural love that 
society has determined it wishes to embody in law.
262
 
 
 
that America has long imposed various forms of civic duties). 
 256. Cf. Roberts. v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 570 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing 
personal privacy and autonomy are “countervailing social values” against the value of coming to the 
aid of victims of criminal conduct).  
 257. For exceptions to the common-law no-duty rule, see supra notes 114-16 and accompanying 
text. 
 258. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. 
 259. But see Jain, supra note 38, at 1186 (arguing that the justification for this exception is that the 
nature of the special relationship “alert[s] both potential rescuers and victims to the victims’ right to 
depend on the rescuers”). 
 260. See supra text accompanying notes 117-24. 
 261. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 262. This point suggests that the Halakhic duty to aid is similar to its American counterpart, even 
in those jurisdictions that do not have a statutory duty to aid. Inasmuch as these common-law 
jurisdictions, like Halakha, recognize the Love Principle, then the difference between them is merely 
one of degree. That is, these common-law jurisdictions recognize the Love Principle but establish that 
it should govern only in certain narrow cases (i.e., those involving special relationships), whereas 
Halakha establishes that it should govern in all cases. Or put differently, because Halakha perceives 
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Lastly, the greatest proof for the expansion of the Love Principle is found 
in the various duty-to-aid statutes,
263
 and particularly, the four general duty-
to-aid statutes discussed in this Note. Put differently, these statutes represent 
an even greater broadening of the definition of a special relationship. That is, 
by creating a general duty to aid, these statutes effectively require that a 
special relationship exist even between complete strangers.
264
 Therefore, in 
these four states, at least with respect to the duty-to-aid question, the Love 
Principle seemingly has surpassed the Autonomy Principle.
265
 
However, in spite of the expansion of the Love Principle in this country, it 
would be incorrect to claim that the Love Principle has entirely overtaken the 
Autonomy Principle. First, although a duty to aid now exists in this country, 
only a handful of states have adopted it.
266
 In every other jurisdiction, the 
common-law no-duty rule still prevails.
267
 Second, even with respect to the 
duty-to-aid statutes, themselves, the Love principle has not altogether 
supplanted the Autonomy Principle. Recall the number of restrictions that 
limit the statutory duty to aid.
268
 These limitations demonstrate that concerns 
for individual autonomy still lurk beneath even the general duty-to-aid 
statutes.
269
 Therefore, although the new statutes show that the Love Principle 
is expanding, it is clear that the Autonomy Principle is not completely buried. 
To this extent, the statutory duty to aid remains quite different from the 
Halakhic duty to aid.  
 
 
that there must be a special relationship between every member of the community, it establishes that 
the special relationship exception should be the general rule! Halakha establishes that there must be a 
special relationship between every member of the community because of the Divine commandment to 
love one’s fellow as oneself. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text. 
 263. For a listing of states with limited duty-to-aid statutes, see supra note 17 and accompanying 
text. 
 264. Of course, this general duty is still subject to numerous limitations. See statutes cited supra 
notes 131, 132, 134, 135 and accompanying text. 
 265. Some may regard the Halakhic duty to aid as racist and bigoted inasmuch as it only applies to 
members of the Jewish community. See supra note 151. However, as discussed above, the Halakhic 
duty to aid, as well as the common law and statutory duty to aid, may be based on the same principle 
and only diverge in their application. See infra note 262 and accompanying text. The common law 
took the most restrictive view and imposed this duty only in certain special relationships situations. 
The recent duty to aid statutes, in one sense, take the most expansive view and impose the duty in all 
situations, although the statutes contain many conditions that severely limit the duty. The Halakhic 
duty to aid takes a middle ground by expanding the duty to every member of the Jewish community 
(i.e., one’s larger family) but not beyond to humanity in general. Thus, the Halakhic duty to aid does 
not reflect any animosity to non-Jews. Instead, it represents a different attempt to implement legally 
the same principle that all three approaches recognize.  
 266. See states listed supra notes 17, 20. 
 267. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 268. See Part II.C.1-3. 
 269. For restrictions on the statutes’ duty to aid, see supra notes 109, 238-40 and accompanying 
text. 
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C. Principle #3: “Good Man” vs. “Bad Man” View of Law 
Oliver Wendell Holmes was one of earliest thinkers in this country to 
argue in support of the so-called “bad man” view of law:  
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a 
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such 
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds 
reasons for his conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the 
vaguer sanctions of conscience.
270
 
According to Holmes, American law operates on the fundamental 
principle that law can only influence people’s behavior insofar as they are 
able to ascertain readily the flesh and blood consequences of their actions.
271
  
Halakha takes a different view of humanity and maintains that, while 
human beings certainly have a bad side, they are fundamentally good.
272
 
Accordingly, Halakha sets forth laws that conform with this dual nature for 
good and bad.
273
 Halakha presupposes “a G–d fearing society with a belief in 
a Heavenly Tribunal. The model is a person for whom a divine sanction is a 
real, concrete matter.”274  
The belief in a Divine judge that rewards and punishes
275
 is related to the 
Halakhic view that human beings have a dual nature for good and bad. On 
one hand, the fact that sanctions come from G-d and are imposed in ways 
that are not readily ascertainable reflects the view that human beings are 
good. That is, this view of punishment presupposes that people can be 
influenced to behave in a certain way without the threat of a direct, physical 
punishment. A human being can understand that actions have consequences 
that transcend the immediate here and now. 
On the other hand, that Halakha sanctions people at all demonstrates its 
presupposition that human beings have a potential for bad. If human beings 
did not have any potential for bad and instead were only capable of fulfilling 
the will of G-d, sanctions would be entirely unnecessary. However, a 
potential for bad does exist, and therefore, Halakha must set forth 
 
 
 270. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). 
 271. See id. See also JAMES A. HENDERSON, THE TORTS PROCESS 96-98, 293-97 (5th ed. 1999). 
 272. On one hand, Halakha recognizes that humanity has a propensity for bad and for violating 
the will of G-d: “the inclination of the heart of man is evil from his youth.” Genesis 8:21. See also 
Genesis 6:5. On the other hand, the Torah indicates that humanity is fundamentally good. “G-d created 
man in His image, in the image of G-d.” Genesis 1:27. See generally RABBI SHNEUR ZALMAN OF 
LIADI, TANYA. 
 273. See Eliash, supra note 93, at 624. 
 274. Id.  
 275. For a discussion of moral and legal duty, see supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. 
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consequences for misbehavior, even if they are not readily apparent. 
These two very different views of human nature explain why the 
Halakhic and statutory duties to aid diverge with respect to sanctions. As 
discussed above, persons violating the Halakhic duty to aid are not punished 
by the courts, as is always the case in Halakha with violations of positive 
duties to act.
276
 Violators are ultimately punished but by the Divine judge.
277
 
This system of Divine sanction reflects the dual nature of humanity assumed 
by Halakha.  
Consistent with the bad man view of law, the statutory duty to aid does 
establish specific, though minimal, sanctions for noncompliance.
278
 One 
could even argue that prosecutors have rarely tried to enforce the duty-to-aid 
statutes precisely because of the nominal sanctions they entail.
279
 That is, 
under the bad man view of the law, prosecutors have calculated that it is not 
worth the time, money, and effort to enforce these laws given the limited 
effect they have on influencing behavior. Any effect on behavior brought 
about by imposing the statutory sanctions would be outweighed by the costs 
incurred in doing so.  
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE STATUTORY DUTY TO AID AND HOW 
HALAKHA MIGHT RESPOND 
Two principal arguments, one theoretical and one practical, have been 
leveled against the duty to aid:
280
 (1) the theoretical argument is that a duty to 
aid infringes upon one’s individual autonomy;281 (2) the practical argument is 
simply that a duty to aid is impossible to enforce.
282
  
A. Argument #1: Duty-to-Aid Statutes Infringe upon Individual Autonomy 
The American legal system has assigned a special value to individual 
autonomy (the Autonomy Principle).
283
 The most ardent supporters of this 
 
 
 276. See supra Part II.C.6 Element #6: Consequences of Noncompliance with the Duty. 
 277. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. 
 278. For penalties imposed by the four general duty-to-aid statutes, see supra notes 222-25 and 
accompanying text. 
 279. For a discussion of enforcement issues, see supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. See 
also Stewart, supra note 3, at 424. 
 280. For a list of the other arguments that have made against the duty to aid, see notes 36, 37 and 
accompanying text. 
 281. See supra note 38.  
 282. See supra note 39. 
 283. See Arcuri, supra note 37, at 476 (“In a democratic society, the basic and most obvious 
argument against forcing people to help others is that such a law will interfere with an individual’s 
freedom and privacy.”). See also supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text. 
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principle argue that laws are justified only to the extent that they are aimed at 
protecting and furthering autonomy.
284
 Accordingly, governments may pass 
laws that prevent one individual from doing harm to another.
285
 In such 
cases, one individual is not respecting another’s autonomy, and therefore, the 
law may legitimately sanction the individual’s actions.286 However, 
governments should not pass laws that force one individual to confer benefits 
on another. In these cases, one individual is simply minding her own 
business and has in no way harmed another. As such, she is outside the 
province of law and should be left alone, even if, as a result, the other 
individual will suffer great harm.
287
 If she wishes to confer a benefit upon 
that individual and to save her from this harm, she may of course do so, but 
the law may not force this course of action. 
The Halakhic response to this argument is very simple: the Autonomy 
Principle should not be the fundamental principle by which the legitimacy of 
laws are measured.
288
 To the contrary, justice is measured by the extent to 
which laws embody the fundamental duties that persons owe to one another. 
And more specifically, laws are just to the extent that they recognize the most 
fundamental duty of loving one’s fellow as oneself (the Love Principle).289 
When a person performs this duty and loves her fellow as her own self, she 
realizes a higher purpose in life and thereby achieves true freedom.
290
 
At first blush, these ideas might appear quite radical. And indeed, stated 
in this extreme form, they are. However, the discussion of the Love and 
Autonomy Principles in Part III demonstrates how the Halakhic response is 
not entirely alien to the American tradition. The evolution of the duty-to-aid 
rules shows that the Love Principle is gaining ground on the Autonomy 
Principle.
291
 To this extent, the Halakhic response may not elicit as much 
opposition as one might think. That is, to the extent that American law seems 
to be moving toward the Love Principle and away from a strict Autonomy 
principle, the Halakhic response may gain greater favor in the coming years. 
 
 
 284. See Givelber, supra note 37, at 3174 (“[T]he proper function of law is to protect individual 
rights against infringement.” (quoting Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 
VAND. L. REV. 673, 676 (1994))); Jain, supra note 38, at 1198-2000; Lipkin, supra note 109, at 277 
(“[T]he formation of the state is justified only if it reflects the individual’s autonomous choices.”); 
Kaplan, Iverson Act, supra note 36, at 69-70. 
 285. For example, governments may pass laws that prohibit murder, assault, and theft. 
 286. See supra notes 283-84. 
 287. See supra notes 283-84. 
 288. See supra notes 228-31 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra notes 243-44 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra note 231. 
 291. See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
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B. Argument #2: Duty-to-Aid Statutes are Impossible to Implement 
Proponents of this argument maintain that enforcement of duty-to-aid 
statutes requires extensive investigation and adjudication, which is extremely 
costly and time-consuming.
292
 The Seinfeld incident helps to illustrate the 
difficulties of implementing a statutory duty to aid. First, a prosecutor would 
need to show that Seinfeld and his friends saw or knew, depending on the 
jurisdiction, that the victim was in peril and in need of assistance.
293
 
However, some of the Seinfeld group might be aware of the situation and 
thus be under a duty to provide aid, while others might not. Sorting out who 
was and was not aware would be difficult.  
Moreover, the prosecutor would have difficulty showing that the Seinfeld 
group did not qualify for the easy-rescue limitation.
294
 That is, the foursome 
could easily argue that they did not render aid because they thought they 
would have been injured if they had tried to intervene. Additionally, the 
Seinfeld group could argue that they did not call the police because they 
reasonably assumed that someone else had already reported the incident. In 
that case, they would be exempt because the statutes absolve one from aiding 
another if the aid is already being provided.
295
 
Indeed, if someone had called the police, the prosecutor could still argue 
that no one in the Seinfeld group was aware of the call, or at least, not all of 
them. If so, the prosecutor would still have the difficulty of distinguishing 
those who knew of the call from those who did not. Moreover, even if a call 
had been made and the prosecutor could determine precisely who was aware 
of the call, it is possible that their reasons for refusing to provide aid would 
still be illegitimate.
296
 It would be impossible for the prosecutor to assess the 
mental state of each person and distinguish between those who responded 
legitimately and who did not. 
The Halakhic response is again very simple: These practical concerns are 
entirely justified, and therefore courts should not try to enforce the duty. 
Accordingly, the Halakhic duty to aid does not set forth any sanctions, or not 
any humanly-imposed sanctions at least.
297
 Instead, Halakha takes the “good 
man” view of the law and establishes that laws can influence behavior even 
when those laws are not supported by readily ascertainable flesh-and-blood 
 
 
 292. See supra note 39. See also supra 137 note and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. 
 294. For a discussion of the easy-rescue limitation, see supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 296. That is, they choose simply not to render aid. Their choice did not rest on legitimate grounds; 
e.g., they thought they would have been injured; they thought that aid was already on the way.  
 297. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. 
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sanctions.
298
 The Halakhic duty to aid gives the rescuer the choice of 
performing the duty or answering to the Divine judge. Moreover, the Divine 
judge presupposed by Halakha has a perfect knowledge of the facts, which 
include not only external events but also the inner workings of one’s mind 
and heart.
299
 With this perfect knowledge, the Divine judge can assess the 
appropriate penalty.
300
  
In other words, Halakha is not concerned with exacting perfect justice on 
Earth. It recognizes that the attempt to do so is practically impossible because 
of the limits of human knowledge. Indeed, an attempt at perfect justice on 
earth could result in punishing the innocent or the commission of other 
miscarriages of justice.
301
 Therefore, with its presupposition of a Divine 
judge who possesses a perfect knowledge of the facts, Halakha is content to 
catch up with the wrongdoer at a later time. In the eyes of Halakha, this lack 
of justice on earth is not forgiveness but deferral.
302
  
This response might seem even more radical than the full ascendancy of 
the Love Principle discussed in the previous section. In many ways this 
response does contain extremely radical ideas, especially the belief in a 
Divine judge. However, not all of these ideas are alien in American law. 
Although Justice Holmes’s bad man view of the law is the majority opinion 
in the American legal system, it certainly is not the only opinion.
303
 Some 
American legal thinkers have taken the Halakhic view that humanity is 
basically good and therefore capable of responding to unenforceable rules. 
Indeed, many scholars now study small communities and industries in this 
country that are largely governed by unenforceable rules.
304
 These studies 
confirm the good man view of the law that rules can influence behavior even 
if they do not carry immediate flesh-and-blood sanctions.
305
 
However, even after a thorough examination of American and common 
law, one will not find any mention of a Divine judge that works hand in hand 
with an earthly court. The closest thing to the Divine judge is the famous 
 
 
 298. See supra notes 272-74 and accompanying text. 
 299. By His very nature, a Divine judge has these powers. If He did not have perfect knowledge of 
the inner workings of one’s mind and heart, He would not be Divine. 
 300. See KAPLAN, HANDBOOK, supra note 95, 270-71 (quoting BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shabbat 
105b; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin 90a; BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Nedarim 32a). 
 301. This recognition of the dangers of attempting to execute perfect justice in this world explains 
why Halakha imposes far stricter requirements on the admission of evidence in court. Only a small 
fraction of evidence that is admissible in American courts would be admissible in an Halakhic court. 
See generally BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhendrin. 
 302. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 303. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 4-6 (1969). 
 304. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991). 
 305. Id. 
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“conscience” that the law often mentions.306 Although statements about the 
“conscience” suggest a belief in a higher authority that judges human actions, 
it is not given the same concrete, legal status as the Divine judge in 
Halakha.
307
 Therefore, until America explores the possibility of a Divine 
judge, the gap between the Halakhic and statutory duties to aid might be 
irreconcilable.
308
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Halakhic duty to aid is, in several respects, far more expansive than 
the statutory duty to aid. The Halakhic duty to aid is more easily triggered, 
and once it is triggered, it requires the rescuer to make an extraordinary effort 
to save the victim. Moreover, unlike the statutory duty to aid, the Halakhic 
duty to aid requires the rescuer to continue her rescue efforts, even if doing 
so is dangerous. To mitigate the potential severity of the Halakhic duty, the 
rabbis provided the rescuer with generous immunity protections and 
compensation rights. Also, the Halakhic duty to aid is enforced not through 
human courts but through a Divine judge.  
These differences originate in the following different principles on which 
Halakha and American law are built: (1) Halakha defines freedom primarily 
in terms of one’s capacity to seek a higher purpose in life, whereas American 
law defines freedom primarily in terms of one’s capacity to live free of 
unwanted intrusions; (2) Halakha places the value of loving one’s fellow as 
oneself before the value of individual autonomy, whereas American law 
reverses the importance of these values; and (3) Halakha takes a “good man” 
view of law, whereas American law takes a “bad man” view, and related to 
this, Halakha presupposes the existence of a divine judge, whereas American 
law does not.  
Despite these different principles, the gap between the Halakhic and 
statutory duties to aid has shrunk considerably. This narrowing has primarily 
derived from the fact that America has been increasingly open to the 
 
 
 306. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281, 282 (Kan. 1903). 
[W]itholding relief from the suffering, for failure to respond to the calls of worthy charity, or for 
faltering in the bestowment of brotherly love on the unfortunate, penalties are not found in the 
laws of men, but in that higher law, the violation of which is condemned by the voice of 
conscience, whose sentence of punishment for the recreant act is swift and sure. 
Id. at 282. 
 307. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.  
 308. Cf. Rabbi Omar Furmansky, Patterns of Existence, (Sept. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with the Geulus Yisrael University Library) (arguing that an essential step to bridging the gap 
between Halakha and other legal systems is their acknowledgment of a Divine judge, and more 
generally, their acknowledgement of the existence of G-d). 
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Halakhic principle that one should love one’s fellow as oneself. However, as 
long as the American legal system ignores the possibility of a Divine judge, 
the differences between the Halakhic and statutory duties to aid will persist. 
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